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Gender and race have disappeared from the face of tort law. The
old doctrines that explicitly limited recovery exclusively to one gender
have been either abolished or extended on a gender-neutral basis.
Women as well as men may now recover for such claims as loss of
t a2spousal consortium and loss of a child's services. The disabilities
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' At common law, only the husband had a cause of action for loss of consortium
when his wife suffered a nonfatal injury. The husband's claim was originally for loss of
his wife's services, likened to the master's claim for loss of his servant's services in cases
where the servant suffered physical injury. The husband's claim was gradually ex-
panded to include recovery for the "three Ss": loss of sex, society, and services. Be-
ginning in the 1950s, most states expanded the claim on a gender-neutral basis to
permit wives to recover for losses they sustained when their husbands were injured. See
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 931-32 (5th ed.
1984); WEX S. MALONE, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 56-57 (1979) (discussing the rights of
husbands and wives to recover losses suffered through injuries to their spouses). The
most pressing issue today is whether courts should further expand the claim to unmar-
ried intimates, including same-sex couples who are not permitted to marry. See, e.g.,
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588-90 (Cal. 1988) (denying loss-of-consortium claim
to unmarried cohabitants).
2 As the "head and master" of the household, the father was originally the only
parent allowed to sue for the loss of his child's services. The father's claim for services
was an outgrowth of his right to custody of unemancipated children. Mothers had a
right to recover when their children were negligently injured only if the father was
dead or had abandoned the family, or if the parents had never married. See MALONE,
supra note 1, at 57-58 (discussing a parent's right to recover losses suffered through
injury to a child). Today, in those states that recognize the claim for loss of a child's
consortium, including the intangible elements of loss of companionship, society, and
affection, the claim is generally accorded to both parents. See, e.g., Shockley v. Prier,
225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Wis. 1975) (recognizing that both parents of an injured minor
"may maintain a cause of action for loss of aid, comfort, society and companionship");
KEETON ET AL, supra note 1, at 934-35 (noting that the courts have shown
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that prevented slaves, free persons of color, and married women4
from filing suit on their own behalf and giving testimony in court
have been lifted by legislation guaranteeing access to the courts. Ju-
ries are now integrated, and even peremptory challenges may no
longer be exercised on the basis of race s or gender.5
But as in so many other areas of the law, formal equality on the
face of the law of torts bears little connection to gender and race eq-
uity as measured by real-world standards. Most empirical studies in-
dicate that women of all races and minority men continue to receive
significantly lower damage awards than white men in personal injury
and wrongful death suits. 7 Some of these data have been generated
by the movement to study gender and race bias in the courts,s with
the predominant focus being on disparities between men and
"considerable willingness" in recent years to allow both parents to recover for loss of a
child's consortium).
3 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 first addressed civil disabilities that had excluded
blacks from the protection of the civil courts. It guaranteed that "[a]ll per-
sons.., shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of their persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a) (1994).
4 The doctrine of marital unity or coverture suspended women's legal identity dur-
ing marriage. With few exceptions, married women could not sue in their own right
and were dependent on their husbands' legal initiatives on their behalf. See I WILLIAM
BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES *430-31 (discussing feme-covert, the incorporation of a
woman's "legal existence" into her husband's, and its effect on a woman's right to
sue). Gradually, in the mid-19th century, states passed Married Women's Property
Acts and earnings statutes, which afforded a measure of legal autonomy to women. See
Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. LJ. 1359, 1423-
24 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103YALE LJ. 1073, 1112-205 (1994) (tracing the de-
velopment of marital joint-property laws in 19th-century America); see also Richard H.
Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 8-30 (1985)
(discussing the legal history of Oregon's married women's property laws).
5 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (barring
race-based peremptories in civil trials).
6 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (barring gender-
based peremptories as violative of equal protection).
See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
8 State and federal task forces on gender and race bias in the courts have focused
attention on inequities in tort law, particularly with respect to damages and other ar-
eas often neglected by torts scholars. The final reports of these task forces represent a
body of practical scholarship that integrates feminist theory, empirical research, and
advocacy for reform. See NINTH CIRcUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE EFFECTS OF
GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL L. REv. 745, 949-62
(1994); Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952, 955-77 (1996)
(discussing various studies analyzing the effects of gender in the courts).
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women.9 These data confirm that in the realm of torts a higher value
is placed upon the lives of white men and that injuries suffered by this
group are worth more than injuries suffered by other less privileged
groups in society.
For example, my calculations from tort judgments and settle-
ments reported in a 1996 guide for personal injury lawyers indicate
that, in the aggregate, male plaintiffs received awards that were
twenty-seven percent higher than those of female plaintiffs.'0 Simi-
larly, a study of wrongful death cases between 1984 and 1988 con-
ducted by the Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in
the Courts found that the mean damage award for a male decedent
was $332,166, compared to a mean award of $214,923 for a female
decedent." A nationwide study of jury awards in personal injury
cases, conducted by Jury Verdict Research, Inc., showed that in virtu-
ally all age groups, women received significantly lower mean and me-
dian compensatory damage awards than did men. Although there
9 The empirical data are not very refined. Most gender bias task force reports in-
clude data broken down only by gender, without also sorting for race. The racial bias
studies typically use only two racial categories, white and black. Thus, separate atten-
tion is not consistently paid to the situation of minority women and racial groups
other than African-Americans. The most recent U.S. Government report on earnings
includes a breakdown by gender and breaks down "race" to include the census catego-
ries of white, black, Hispanic-origin, and Asian and Pacific Islanders. It includes no
separate listing for other ethnic groups. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at ix (1995) (comparing in-
come by "selected characteristics").
'0 The 27% figure was calculated by totaling the 1995-1996 awards and settlements
recorded across 28 categories of specific types of injuries (from abdominal to wrist in-
juries, including wrongful death). See WHAT'S IT WORTH? A GUIDE TO CURRENT
PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS AND SETrLEMENTS (James P. Munger ed., 1996). The data-
base created from this compilation consists of 1200 summaries of decisions and set-
tiements taken from court reports and from publications of the American Trial Law-
yers Association from April 1995 to March 1996. It represents an unrefined measure
that does not control for severity of injury within categories, for age, occupation, or
educational attainment of the plaintiff, or for other factors that might influence the
size of the award. Nevertheless, my point here is simply to document a gross disparity
in overall compensation between men and women.
" WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS,
GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS 89-90 (1989) (listing Washington statistics for
wrongful death jury awards for men and women).
12 See 5 JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS:
THE AGED AS PLAINTIFFS, pts. I & 11 (1987), cited in ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER
BIAS IN THE COURTS, THE 1990 REPORT 181 n.3 (1990) [hereinafter ILLINOIS TASK
FORCE]. The only age groups in which women did not fare poorly compared to men
were plaintiffs aged 60-64 and over 80. See id.; see also JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL,
RAND CORPORATION, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL
1998]
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are fewer data analyzing tort awards along racial lines, a Washington
study of asbestos cases in the 1980s found substantial disparities be-
tween settlement amounts of minority and nonminority plaintiffs."'
Recently, scholars have focused on specific elements of damage
14awards, including punitive damages and damages for loss of future
earning capacity,' 5 in an attempt to pinpoint the source of the gender
and race disparities. This Article has a more theoretical focus. It rep-
resents my search to uncover the dominant value structures, or hier-
archies, in tort law that have worked to the disadvantage of women of
all races and minority men. These deep structures are cognitive in
nature and operate within a system that is facially neutral with respect
to gender and race. I contend that, most often, bias finds its way into
the law, not through explicit differential treatment of men and
women or racial minorities and whites, but through reliance on im-
plicit hierarchies of values and dichotomous thinking.
Throughout this Article, I employ a broad definition of bias, by
which I hope to capture those habits of mind and practices that are
most effective in reproducing the inequities of the status quo. In this
Article, bias includes both deliberate and unconscious disparities in
the treatment of persons who are similarly situated, whether stem-
ming from animus, hostility, insensitivity, lack of empathy, or the use
of stereotypes or unfair generalizations about a group. In addition to
disparate treatment, I use the term bias to include practices, doc-
trines, or policies that have a disproportionately harmful effect on a
group and cannot be justified by reference to other competing inter-
ests or concerns. My definition of bias thus includes both intentional
(i.e., disparate treatment) and unintentional (i.e., disparate impact)
bias and focuses on both the state of mind of the actor and the effect
on the victim. Most importantly, bias herein encompasses what might
TERMINATION 31 (1988) (showing considerably lower wrongful termination awards for
women, even after controlling for current salary levels).
is SeeWASHINGTON STATE MINORITYANDJUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 123-25
(1990) (comparing minority and nonminority settlements for various injuries); see also
AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORPORATION, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTYJURY TRIALS 40 (1985) (finding that, in cases
involving white defendants, awards for African-Americans in state and federal jury tri-
als totaled only 74% as much as awards for white plaintiffs for the same injury).
,4 SeeThomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1995) (analyzing the nature of the injuries for
which punitive damages are sought by men and women).
is See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specdfic Eco-
nomic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argumen 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75
(1994) (arguing that the uncritical use of statistical data keyed to race and gender has
led to dramatically lower damage awards for women and minorities).
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be termed cognitive bias, by which I mean the use of categories that are
themselves shaped or contaminated by confining stereotypes and ha-
bitual ways of thinking about nondominant groups in our society.
For the most part, this definition of bias tracks legal concepts of
discrimination, especially those employed in employment discrimina-
tion litigation. However, because I focus so prominently on uncon-
scious and nondeliberate kinds of bias, I sometimes go beyond tradi-
tional meanings of discrimination to highlight inequities that would
not be actionable under prevailing constitutional and antidiscrimina-
tion doctrine. This broad definition of bias seems particularly appro-
priate in evaluating tort law. In constructing the common law, judges
and juries are not confined to avoiding illegalities, but are expected
to reach for fairness and an equitable accommodation of interests.
The "public policy" dimension of tort law is broad enough to include
the goal of advancement of gender and race justice, in addition to
promoting such values as economic efficiency, ease of judicial ad-
ministration, or common standards of morality.
My primary contention is that contemporary tort law devalues or
undervalues the lives, activities, and potential of women and people
of color. Applying critical theory, I argue that this devaluation is ac-
complished by subtle means, through the social construction of legal
categories that purport to describe types of injuries and types of dam-
ages. I look for the hidden gender or racial dimension in basic legal
categories, such as "physical harm" or "pecuniary loss." When these
"neutral" categories of injuries and damages are ranked in impor-
tance, there is often a negative impact on nondominant groups. Spe-
cifically, I assert that injuries of low value are more often associated
with women, while injuries of high value are more often linked to
men. The devaluation process can also work to contaminate the very
neutrality of the categories themselves. My research suggests that the
gender of the victim plays an important role. In deciding how to
categorize a loss, the law looks not only in some abstract way at the
nature of the injury or loss, but also at who is suffering the loss. In
this way, the gender of the prototypical plaintiff affects how we con-
ceptualize the nature of the harm.
This Article is informed by concepts in antidiscrimination law,
principally the theory of discrimination known as "disparate impact"
liability.16 My approach also draws heavily upon both feminist theory
16 Disparate impact liability is premised on the harmful effects of a policy or action
on a traditionally disadvantaged group. Typically, the employer or other defendant
1998]
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and critical race theory. From these areas, I import the notion of
gender-linked and race-linked devaluation of harm. This type of bias
is central to my contention that the deep cognitive structures in tort
law are not neutral and that basic tort categories carry hidden gender
and racial associations.
Part I of this Article explains what I mean by devaluation. I look at
the concept of devaluation generally, drawing from criminal law and
employment law, as well as from the torts context. I offer examples of
devaluation of the lives, activities, and potential of women and people
of color in cases where there may be no disparate treatment of indi-
viduals. I focus on these three contexts because they bear an obvious
relevance to cognizable injuries in tort law.
The rest of the Article is devoted to speculation as to how this de-
valuation is accomplished in the law of torts. I focus predominately
on gender devaluation and its possible effects on diverse groups of
women. My starting point is an assertion about the architecture of
contemporary tort law. In Part II, I claim that there is a widespread, if
tacit, acceptance of a hierarchy of types of injuries and types of dam-
ages. Although we do not always tell our students about this on the
first day of class, tort law values physical injuries and property damage
more highly than emotional injuries or relational harms. More re-
cently, another hierarchy has emerged which complements, but does
not duplicate, the hierarchy of types of injuries. This implicit hierar-
chy of damages values pecuniary losses (e.g., wage loss and medical
expenses) over nonpecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental
distress, and lost companionship and society). These two implicit hi-
erarchies of value appear neutral because they are not explicitly tied
to any gender or racial group. They have power to influence our
thought, moreover, precisely because they are taken for granted and
not often subjected to scrutiny by the courts or scholars.
The apparent neutrality of the tort hierarchies of value, however,
does not produce a system that is equal or symmetric in results. To
will be required to justify the harmful policy by proving that it is necessary for the
business and related to the requirements of thejob. Proof of invidious motivation or
intent is not necessary because it is the unjustified harmful effect that is the harm to
be remedied. Originally ajudicial invention, disparate impact claims have since been
endorsed and codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1)
(1994). For recent discussions of disparate impact theory, see Barbara Flagg, Fashion-
ing a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104YALE L.J. 2009,
2031-38 (1995) (discussing the adequacy and breadth of Title VII); Ramona L. Paet-
zold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through
New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 364-77 (1996) (discussing "blindered causation" as the
defining characteristic of the disparate impact model).
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borrow a Title VII concept, the hierarchies have a disproportionate
negative impact on women. In Part III of this Article, I offer three
examples of such disparate impact on women. The first two result
from privileging physical harm over relational and emotional harm.
The third exemplifies how the preference for pecuniary over nonpe-
cuniary losses harms women. I argue that it is appropriate to regard
the tort law hierarchies of values as "gendered" because over time
they tend to produce and reproduce gender disparities both in the
types of legally recognized injuries and in the value placed on certain
losses.
The fourth and final Part focuses on the origin of gendered hier-
archies and asks how the gender correlation is maintained under a
legal regime ostensibly committed to gender equality. At this junc-
ture, I use critical theory to suggest the existence of a conceptual vi-
cious cycle as a possible mechanism for reproducing gender bias.
This cycle is a process of devaluation. The vicious cycle works to forge
a cognitive connection between basic types of injuries and damages
on the one hand and gender on the other. The categories that de-
scribe types of injuries and types of damages are dualistic; the domi-
nant discourse in torts is cast in terms of physical versus emotional in-
juries or pecuniary versus nonpecuniary losses. We then map onto
these dualisms corresponding gender labels, associating women with
emotional injury and nonpecuniary harm. The final step in the proc-
ess of devaluation is perceptual: We are apt to perceive and catego-
rize injury sustained by women as emotional or nonpecuniary, even
when the injury could logically also be characterized as physical or as
having pecuniary value. The vicious cycle is then complete: Emo-
tional harm and nonpecuniary loss are devalued because of their
cognitive association with women, and the harm that women suffer is
more likely to fall into one of the disfavored "female" categories. On
a material level, operation of the vicious cycle thus perpetuates lower
awards for women because their losses are more likely to rank lower
on the hierarchy.
Because devaluation affects the construction of categories, not
simply individuals, men whose lives and activities follow "female" pat-
terns are also disadvantaged. The conceptual vicious cycle may have
an ideological dimension as well, insofar as it functions to discount
the importance of women's suffering as measured in the civil justice
system. By so privatizing women's suffering, the law quietly repro-
19981
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duces the gendered public/private split 7 at a time when tort law is
most often criticized for favoring plaintiffs and exaggerating the sig-
nificance of their losses.
I. DEVALUATION AS A GENERAL CONCEPT
For lawyers and law students, the most easily understood kind of
discrimination is what is known as disparate treatment. The Equal
Protection Clause has been interpreted to reach only this kind of dis-
crimination, 8 and it so dominates legal discourse that it is sometimes
mistaken for the only conceivable form of discrimination. Simply
stated, disparate treatment consists of conduct that intentionally tar-
gets individuals for unfavorable treatment because of their race, gen-
der, or other personal characteristics.' 9 Thus, the equal protection
principle would be violated if men but not women were allowed to re-
cover for certain defined injuries or if a judge or jury deliberately
based its decision to deny relief on the individual plaintiff's race or
gender.
The focus of this Article, however, is on devaluation, rather than
disparate treatment. Devaluation is a kind of bias that does not always
attach itself directly to the individual asserting legal rights or defend-
ing against legal prosecution. It instead affects value judgments, such
as those made about the seriousness of certain conduct or the impor-
tance of an activity. There is a crucial connection between these value
judgments and race and gender: To the extent that conduct is cogni-
tively associated with women or racial minorities, it descends in im-
portance. That is why devaluation is justifiably counted as a form of
bias. However, an important distinction between devaluation and or-
dinary disparate treatment is that devaluation is not directly depend-
17 For discussions of how the false dichotomy between the public and private
spheres harms women, see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideol-
ogy and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1527-30 (1983) (noting that sharp concep-
tual distinctions between market and family limit our thinking and legal reforms);
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in
THE PoLITIcs OF LAW 151, 151-76 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
'8 The Supreme Court first rejected Title VII's disparate impact analysis for use in
equal protection cases in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976). After Davis,
challengers were required to prove discriminatory purpose and show that the deci-
sionmaker acted "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse ef-
fects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979).
19 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-55 (1977)
(distinguishing disparate treatment from disparate impact in Title VII cases).
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ent on a particular actor's race or gender. Once a category is deval-
ued, all individuals within that category feel the effects of devaluation.
Even the male receptionist, for example, loses prestige for doing a
woman'sjob .
The discussion that follows examines the processes of devaluation
generally, before focusing exclusively on tort law and the devaluation
of types of injuries and types of damages associated with women and
racial minorities. The examples are intended to show how seemingly
neutral conceptual constructs, such as crimes or jobs, may become
linked cognitively to a particular gender or race and how this process
affectsjudgments about relative worth.
A. Devaluation of Black Life
A dramatic illustration of devaluation involves the operation of
the criminal justice system in death penalty cases. A large-scale em-
pirical study done by Professor David Baldus for the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund showed that, in Georgia, defendants charged with kill-
ing white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sen-
tence than defendants charged with killing blacks, even after 230
nonracial variables, such as the brutality of the crime and other ag-
gravating factors, were taken into account.2 Using the same model,
the study found that the race of the defendant was a far less impor-
tant factor than the race of the victim: Black defendants were only 1.1
times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.2
The findings of the Baldus study highlighted the harsh reality that
the lives of whites have greater value in our society than the lives of
blacks: The taking of white lives merits stiffer punishment.2 Using
See infra notes 39, 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween the prototypical holder of a given position and the status that attaches to that
position).
21 The Baldus study was at the center of an unsuccessful equal protection chal-
lenge to imposition of the death penalty in McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-99
(1987). The study is discussed in DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY (1990).
See McCle4ky, 481 U.S. at 287. The combined factors of the race of the victim and
the race of the defendant did, however, correlate with the decision to seek the death
penalty. The raw data indicated that the prosecutor sought the death penalty in 70%
of the cases involving a black defendant and a white victim, 32% of the cases involving
a white defendant and a white victim, 15% of the cases involving a black defendant
and a black victim, and 19% of the cases involving a white defendant and a black vic-
tim. See id.
2 For other studies finding a similar race-of-the-victim effect in capital cases, see
U.S. GEN. ACcOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, in REPORT TO THE
1998]
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the statistical technique of multiple regression analysis, the study was
able to quantify the importance of the "race of the victim" factor in a
subjective decisionmaking process and to tease out cognitive bias.
The study showed how bias likely affected the evaluation of the seri-
ousness of the crime, with the effect of devaluing black life relative to
white life. This race-linked devaluation differs from ordinary dispa-
rate treatment in that the race effect was not traceable solely to the
race of the defendant. If the focus had only been on the treatment of
the criminal defendants and whether they deserved the death pen-
alty, the system might have appeared more race-neutral.
Race-linked devaluation is a less recognizable form of discrimina-
tion that is likely to stem from unconscious judgments and nondelib-
24erate mental associations. Imagine, for example, a white juror sit-
ting in a criminal case who sincerely wishes to make an unbiased
judgment based on the facts. If both the defendant and the victim
are black, the juror might never consider the possibility that race
could play a role in her judgment. She might never ask herself
whether her gut feeling is somehow affected by racial stereotypes or
other assumptions about the worth of the victim. Few lawyers would
make an appeal like that found in the motion picture A Time to Ki
based on John Grisham's novel by the same name, in which the law-
yer asked the white jurors to counteract the "race of the victim" effect
by imagining that the victimized black child was white instead of
black.2 Rather, the racial factor is more likely to remain unaddressed
and undetected.
SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY 130, 135 (1990) (noting that the
fact that the victim was white influenced the decision to seek the death penalty in 82%
of 28 studies reviewed); Raymond Pasternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the
Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 L. & Soc'Y REV. 437, 471
(1984) (describing a South Carolina study finding that prosecutors are more likely to
seek the death penalty if the victim is white).
24 The most frequently cited article on the topic of unconscious racism is Charles
R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
25 A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996). Professor Jody Armour has argued that
biased judgments based on ingrained stereotypes may sometimes be counteracted if
the decisionmaker is alerted to the operation of the racial factor and urged to reexam-
ine his or herjudgment. SeeJody Armour, Stereotypes and Preudice: Helping Legal Deci-
sionmakers Break the Pryudice Habi 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 759-60 (1995) ("Reminding
decisionmakers of their personal beliefs... may help them to resist falling uncon-
sciously into the discrimination habit."). Some lawyers representing African-American
clients alert prospective jurors to the race of the parties in an attempt to warn them
that unconscious racism might affect their judgments. See Frank M. McClellan, The
Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for RacialJustic4 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 780 (1996)
(recounting one lawyer's voir dire inquiry aboutjurors' possible bias).
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The harms of race-linked devaluation may also be harder to ar-
ticulate than those stemming from ordinary disparate treatment. In
the capital punishment context, for example, if the race of the defen-
dant influences the verdict, a specific black defendant will be slated
for execution under circumstances in which his white counterpart
would escape that fate. When the race of the victim influences the
judgment, however, the individual and collective harms are visited
upon persons other than the criminal defendant. The refusal to im-
pose the harshest penalty for the taking of black lives may mean that
black communities are less safe, if one assumes that the death penalty
operates as a deterrent to homicide. More certain is that the family
and friends of the undervalued black victim will suffer emotional
harm from believing that justice was not served. Most importantly,
the greater societal tolerance for violence inflicted on blacks rein-
forces a cultural belief in the inferiority of blacks and generally con-
tributes to the maintenance of white supremacy. Borrowing from
Dean Paul Brest's classic analysis of the multiple rationales for the an-
tidiscrimination principle, Professor Randall Kennedy has described
the phenomenon of disparate sentencing based on the race of the
victim as "racially selective empathy": "'the unconscious failure to ex-
tend to [blacks] the same recognition of humanity, and hence the
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to [whites].'",7
The devaluation of black lives does not confine itself to capital
28cases, but extends to criminal sentencing in noncapital cases. In
6 See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
c7imination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Su-
preme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988) (quoting Brest, supra note 26, at 7-8).
Studies evidencing such bias are collected in Developments in the Law-Race and
the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1475, 1525-28 (1988), which describes a number
of studies of racial discrimination in both prosecutorial assessment decisions and post-
assessment charging decisions. Published mainly in the early 1980s, these studies
document disparities based on the race of the victim and the race of the defendant,
with the race of the victim being a more important factor. See WILLAMJ. BOWERS ET
AL., LEGAL HoMIcIDE 340-44 (1984) (finding that race of defendant and victim af-
fected probability of obtaining first-degree murder indictment); William J. Bowers &
Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRImE & DELINQ. 563, 614 (1980) (noting that "blacks who kill whites are most likely
to be charged with an accompanying felony"); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual
Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 842, 847-48 (1980)
(reporting that black men who assaulted white women were more likely to be charged
with a felony); Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors
and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBs. 439, 446 (1979) (finding that the
race of the victim affects the decision to charge); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L.
Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L. & SOC'YREV. 587, 615-19
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cases of violent crimes not amounting to homicide, devaluation
means that the health and physical well-being of black victims and
black communities fail to receive the same measure of protection
given to white victims and white communities.2
It is reasonable to suppose that race-linked devaluation of the
lives of minority victims also operates within the civil justice system.
Particularly because tort law is specially designed to fix a specific value
on the life of the decedent in a wrongful death case and to quantify a
plaintiff's loss in a personal injury case, there is no escaping the need
for the factfinder to make an evaluation. Thus, race-linked devalua-
tion potentially affects the heart of the torts process by posing a threat
to the fair adjudication of a central issue in the litigation.
B. Devaluation of Women's Activities
The most adequately theorized example of the devaluation proc-
ess as it affects women and their activities is found in the theory of
comparable worth. Comparable worth theory was developed to ad-
dress the problem of the sizable disparity in earnings between male
and female workers.30 For quite some time, sociologists and feminist
scholars3 ' had contended that a large portion of the wage gap was
(1985) (reporting that a charge is more likely to be upgraded in crimes involving a
white victim and a black defendant).
2Cf. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 1391 (describing devaluation theory as
"community-oriented").
" The wage gap has narrowed in recent years, but is still sizable. In 1986, women's
hourly median earnings were 70% of men's. See SARAH M. EVANS & BARBARA J.
NELSON, WAGE JUSTICE: COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE PARADOX OF TECHNOCRATIC
REFORM 43 (1989). This looked like a dramatic improvement over 59.3%, the figure
reported in 1980, with which most people were familiar (from the phrase "sixty cents
on the dollar"). See id. The 59% figure, however, represented median yearly wages for
full-time, year-round, white workers. See id. The comparable 1986 figure for all
women's yearly wages compared to all men's yearly wages was only 65%. See id. at 43-
44. One researcher estimates that approximately one-third of the gender pay gap
would close if employers adopted traditional job-evaluation plans for pay equity pur-
poses. SeeBARBARAR. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 194 (1986).
31 SociologistJerry Jacobs explains that only in the last 20 years have sociologists
begun to question the "status attainment" framework that had dominated research on
inequality. See Jerry A. Jacobs, Introduction to GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK 1, 3-4
(Jerry A. Jacobs ed., 1995) [hereinafter GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK]. That frame-
work had sought to "delineate the connections between the occupational status of fa-
thers and sons." Id. at 3. Because it omitted women from the framework, the status-
attainment approach did not reveal that "[g]ender inequality [was] not reducible to
social class" and that sex segregation ofjobs and occupations was more important to
explain the gender wage gap. Id. at 3-4; see also BERGMANN, supra note 30, at 123-45
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traceable to the high degree of gender segregation in jobs.3 These
two phenomena have been particularly resistant to change, remaining
largely unaffected by the passage of the Equal Pay Act and Title VIIfL
There was growing recognition that reducing the wage gap necessar-
ily entailed the raising of wage rates in predominantly female jobs.m4
From its inception in the early 1980s, the strategy behind comparable
worth focused directly on devaluation. Unlike ordinary disparate
treatment claims which center on denying women access to tradition-
ally male jobs, comparable worth claims seek to revalue female jobs
and thereby improve conditions for both women and men in these
jobs.a5
Comparable worth theory rests on the proposition that work per-
ceived as women's work has been downgraded and that the value of
work performed in predominantly female jobs-by male and female
workers alike-is systematically underrated, given the relative skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility involved. 6 Comparable worth advocates have
relied on job-evaluation techniques that measure the worth of ajob to
an employer, beyond simply relying on the market wage. Studies
("The key to the low wages attached to women's jobs is the occupational segregation
within a high proportion of workplaces.").
S2 The 1990 census revealed that the labor market is still characterized by a high
degree of sex segregation. Skilled trade jobs continue to be heavily dominated by men
(e.g., only one in 58 carpenters is a woman; one in 20 welders is a woman). See
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 87 (1995) (citing statistics taken from the 1990
U.S. Census). The professions are more integrated but still are identifiably male (e.g.,
79% of physicians are men; 87% of dentists are men; 76% of lawyers are men). See id.
at 88. For a listing and breakdown ofjob categories by gender, see id. at 87-88. Most
women continue to work in low-paying, low-mobility, largely segregated jobs. See
WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 20 LEADING OCCUPAnONS OF EMPLOYED
WOMEN 1990 ANNUAL AVERAGES (1991). Almost half of all women workers are em-
ployed in occupations that are at least 80% female. See WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK
7 (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986).
'3 See EVANS & NELSON, supra note 30, at 16 & n.* (noting that despite antidis-
crimination measures in the 1960s and early 1970s, the wage gap between male and
female workers remained roughly the same).
34 Jobs that are at least 70% female are typically characterized as "female"jobs. See
Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 397, 461 n.236 (1979) (citing N. WILLIs, COM-
PARABLE WORTH STUDY: PHASE 11 (1976)).
See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
See EvANS & NELSON, supra note 30, at 7-8 ("[C]omparable worth is a wage policy
requiring equal pay within ajurisdiction or firm for male- and female-, majority- and
minority-dominatedjob classifications that are valued equally... regardless of the sex
or race ofjob incumbents.").
37 For a discussion ofjob-evaluation techniques, see BERGMANN, supra note 30, at
180-86 (discussing pay-equity evaluations); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality,
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done of public jobs in several states document the existence of sub-
stantial disparities in pay-most often on the order of approximately
twenty percent-between comparable predominantly male and pre-
dominantly female jobs.3M Notably, the more intensely women domi-
nate an occupation, the greater the disparity in wages for both men
and women workers in thatjob category. 9
The theoretical significance of comparable worth theory is its
core contention that women's work is regarded as less important, jus-
tifying a lower wage scale. It is the gender of most of the job holders,
rather than the intrinsic demands of the work, that influences its
place on the job hierarchy. According to Ruth Blumrosen, one of the
earliest comparable worth scholars, a vicious cycle operates to per-
petuate lower wages for women and minority workers:
It is not only that the jobs into which women and minorities have been
traditionally segregated are lower paying jobs, but it is that they are
lower paying, in part at least, because they are the jobs which have been
reserved for minorities and women. The social, historical, and eco-
nomic studies have demonstrated the high degree of likelihood that the
jobs of minorities and women are considered to be of lesser worth be-
cause they are female or minority jobs, and the analysis of both job
evaluation and the general method of setting wages has established how
this value judgment is applied in the setting of wages.
The conceptual vicious cycle as it affects wage rates provides an
explanation for the phenomenon ofjob shifting-the lowering of pay
1988 DurE LJ. 1207, 1228-30 (reviewing the relative- and intrinsic-worth approaches).
Like the market, however, job-evaluation techniques are not free of gender bias. See
RonnieJ. Steinberg, Gendered Instructions: Cultural Lag and Gender Bias in the Hay System
ofJob Evaluation, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK, supra note 31, at 57, 58 ("Even after
conceptions about gender have changed, job evaluation systems of earlier eras may
transport outdated criteria into the new labor market contexts.").
m See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 578 F.
Supp. 846, 864 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (finding a "deliberate perpetuation of an approxi-
mate 20% disparity in salaries between predominately male and predominately female
job classifications with the same number of job evaluation points"), rev'd, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985); AuCE H. COOK, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CrR. OF THE UNIV. OF
HAW. AT MANOA, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE PROBLEM AND THE STATES' APPROACHES
TO WAGE EQUrIY 80-81 (1983) (discussing Wisconsin's statistics); Nina Rothchild, To-
ward Comparable Worth: The Minnesota Experience, 2 YALE L. & POLY REv. 346, 354-55
(1984) (noting a National Organization for Women study which found "staggering"
wage inequalities between women and men).
39 See COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL
VALUE 28 n.13 (DonaldJ. Treiman & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1981) ("[O]n the aver-
age each additional percent female of an occupation costs male workers about $30 in
annual income and female workers about $16...
40 Blumrosen, supra note 34, at 455-57.
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or prestige when a particular job or occupation changes from being
male-dominated to female-dominated. The best known examples in-
volve cross-cultural comparisons: Being a physician is a high status,
high paying job in the United States, where men dominate the field;
in Russia, where most doctors are women, the job carries less prestige
and money. In the United States, this shifting phenomenon took
place over time in the occupations of secretary and bank teller, which
lost prestige when women entered and began to dominate the field.42
The gender shift from male to female may take place when work be-
comes degraded by routinization or mechanization.4 Or the devalua-
tion may occur simply when the field becomes integrated, even when
no change at all occurs in the nature of the tasks. Thus, the influen-
tial research of Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos explains that
feminization has occurred in fields that have already started to dete-
riorate in status.44 What might superficially look like gender integra-
tion might be better viewed as male "flight" from fields with decreas-
ing pay and opportunity. For example, starting in the 1970s, the
gender composition of sociology as an academic field began to
change.45 Women's representation markedly increased at a time
when federal funding for research declined, real earnings decreased,
46and unemployment rose.
A similar phenomenon has occurred within occupations. There
is evidence of resegregation of particular jobs such that segregated
enclaves develop within seemingly integrated occupations. For ex-
", See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DEcEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 152 (1988) (noting that, although women constitute a high percentage
of doctors in Russia, they are confined to the lowest-level jobs in that profession and
denied access to the higher-ranking academic positions); Kaisa Kauppinen et al., Medi-
cal Doctors in Moscow-Their Wo*, Family and Well-Being, in WOMEN'S VOICES IN RUSSIA
TODAY 164, 165-66 (Anna Rotkirch & Elina Haavio-Mannila eds., 1996) (stating that
the proportion of female doctors in Russia from 1980 to 1990 has ranged from 77% to
68%).
42 See BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES:
EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 11-15 (1990) (explaining the
feminization of clerical positions due to decline in earnings, mobility, and job auton-
omy).
43 See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 12
(1979) (arguing that automatedjobs tend to become defined as "women's work").
44 RESKIN & ROOS, supra note 42, at 11-15 (arguing that women entered positions
vacated by men due to the deterioration in the fields).
4 See Patricia A. Roos & Katharine W. Jones, Shifting Gender Boundaries: Women's
Inroads into Academic Sociology, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK, supra note 31, at 297,
303.
46 See id. at 308-15.
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ample, women's influx into pharmacy has been confined largely to
the retail sector, while men work in the more lucrative and more
prestigious commercial, research, and academic settings. Women in
real estate are in residential sales, while men dominate commercial
real estate. The effect is that women's work is still identifiable and
still underpaid compared to the more elite male-dominated sectors.48
Comparable worth theory addresses gender-linked devaluation, as
opposed to ordinary disparate treatment. Because male workers in
predominantly female jobs are also disadvantaged by gendered wage
rates, the harm (depressed wages) and the sex of the job holder are
not connected in a direct, individualistic way. Sociologists call the
theoretical model underlying comparable worth the "status composi-
tion hypothesis." One researcher explains the hypothesis in this way:
The status composition hypothesis is that jobs that are dispropor-
tionately female or male become stereotyped, and the work process it-
self begins to reflect the social value of the master status of typical in-
cumbents. This is not an argument about discrimination against
individuals but against jobs. The argument is that jobs and organiza-
49tional structure may be fundamentally influenced by gender.
We can best understand comparable worth theory as challenging
the cognitive association between women's work and work of low
value. Like the race-linked devaluation uncovered by the Baldus
study,50 the injury unearthed by comparable worth theory is collective
in nature, affecting the group of workers (male and female) who
work in undervalued jobs and occupations. The undervaluation is
not traceable to the sex of the individualjob holder, but rather to the
sex of the prototypicaljob holder.
The courts have not accepted comparable worth as a theory of li-
ability under Title VII. In the mid-1980s, a few influential decisions
in the lower courts51 had the effect of halting the filing of comparable
" See Barbara F. Reskin, Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differentiation and the Devalua-
tion of Women's Work, 2 GENDER & SOC'Y 58, 68-71 (1988).
48 SeeJo Anne Preston, Gender and the Formation of a Women's Profession: The Case of
Public School Teaching, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK, supra note 31, at 379, 396
(discussing the historical study of male domination of elite sectors of teaching).
' Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Sex Composition and Gendered Earnings Inequality: A
Comparison ofJob and Occupational Models, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK, supra note
31, at 23, 29 (citations omitted).
o See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
The two most important cases were Spauldingv. University of Washington, 740 F.2d
686, 706-08 (9th Cir. 1984), which held that disparate impact theory could not be used
to challenge the employer's reliance on market wages, and American Federation of State,
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worth claims and shifting the movement towards implementing com-
parable worth through legislative action and collective bargaining. 2
The major obstacle to judicial acceptance was the courts' reluctance
to displace market rates and their fear that the project would pose too
great an administrative burden on the judiciary in civil rights cases.
The precise portion of the wage gap attributable to discriminatory de-
valuation was the subject of intense debate,53 with the regrettable re-
sult that the courts provided no Title VII remedy, even when the em-
ployer's own job-evaluation study indicated that women's wages were
devalued.5
County & Municipal Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985),
which permitted employers to rely on market prices, even when the employer's own
job-evaluation study indicated that women's jobs were undervalued. Together, the
cases substantially closed off both the disparate treatment and disparate impact ave-
nues of attack to sex-based wage discrimination resulting from occupational discrimi-
nation.
52 By 1987, 20 states had made some comparable worth adjustments for state em-
ployees, but had not extended comparable worth to private employers. See EVANS &
NELSON, supra note 30, at 71-72. The history of the labor movement's involvement
with comparable worth is traced in LINDA M. BLUM, BETWEEN FEMINISM AND LABOR:
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARABLE WORTH MOVEMENT 6-14 (1991) (explaining
that, while the labor movement has historically had a poor record in representing
working women, in recent years it has embraced comparable worth as part of its "new
agenda").
53 Most researchers admit that a significant portion of the male/female wage gap
cannot be explained by human-capital factors such as differences in education, train-
ing, or experience. See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 946 (1993). They disagree, however, as to what portion of the un-
explained differential is attributable to discrimination. See id. Sociologists focusing on
job-level rather than occupational segregation contend that as much as 75% of the
gender wage gap is attributable to sex segregation. See Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note
49, at 38 ("Job sex composition's contribution to the earnings pay gap is now esti-
mated to be 75% ... ."). Part of the problem is determining how to treat women's
"preferences" for certain types of work. Most feminists are skeptical of preference ar-
guments, arguing that women's apparent preferences are influenced by opportunity
structures and workplace cultures. SeeAlice Kessler-Harris, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and Company: A Personal Account, 35 RADICAL
HIST. REV. 57, 65-68 (1986) (arguing for a "multicausal" view of history which recog-
nizes that women's preferences are not the only factor which shaped the role of
women in the workforce); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VI Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1840 (1990) ("Courts who interpret sex segregation
as women's own choice thus negate the very choice they purport to defend."). Even
after adjusting for female preferences, however, one model concluded that imple-
menting comparable worth would result in wage increases on the order of approxi-
mately 10%. See MARKALDRiCH & ROBERT BUCHELE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPARABLE
WORTH 124-27 (1986).
" See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 770 F.2d at 1407 ("Though
the comparability of wage rates in dissimilarjobs may be relevant to a determination of
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The basic insights of comparable worth theory, however, continue
to have a particular salience for tort law. Comparable worth theory
not only cautions that women's wages may not always be a fair meas-
ure of the value of women's activities in the workplace; but it also
alerts us to the possibility of devaluation of women's activities in other
areas, particularly in the home or other nonmarket settings.
C. Devaluation of Potential
The third example of race-linked and gender-linked devaluation
comes from my own research in tort law.5 It involves how the law
measures the potential of female and minority plaintiffs; specifically,
the calculation of their loss of future earning capacity. Evaluating the
potential of a human being is at once a speculative and important
process. Particularly in cases in which plaintiffs are injured or killed
when they are young, little reliable information may be available to
predict how much they would have earned during their lifetime.
5 6
This speculation about potential earning power is critically important
on both a practical and a symbolic level. Loss of future earning ca-
pacity is a "big ticket" item of damages, which can make the differ-
ence between a modest and a sizable award. Because it is a measure
of human potential, moreover, the price the law attaches to lost earn-
ing capacity tells us something about societal judgments concerning
worth, specifically the worth of the individual plaintiff and the groups
to which the individual belongs. It is an important way by which the
law measures "promise," particularly the promise of our children.
While serving on the Iowa task force examining gender and race
bias in the courts,e I learned from judges and practitioners that it is
commonplace in tort litigation to use gender-based, and sometimes
also race-based, tables to determine two important components that
go into calculating loss of future earning capacity-the work-life ex-
pectancy of the plaintiff and the average wage the plaintiff likely
would have earned in the future. Briefly stated, loss of future earning
discriminatory animus, job evaluation studies and comparable worth statistics alone
are insufficient to establish the requisite inference of discriminatory motive critical to
the disparate treatment theory.").
"' See Chamallas, supra note 15, at 81-84.
See id. at 82-83 (discussing the difficulties in evaluating the potential future earn-
ings of children).
-1 See id. at 75.
58 The task force's findings and conclusions on civil damages are found in
EQUALITY IN THE COURTS TASKFORcE, STATE OF IOWA, FINAL REPORT 113-22 (1993).
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capacity is typically measured by estimating the number of years the
plaintiff would have worked had she not been injured (work-life ex-
pectancy) and the amount the plaintiff would have earned each year,
reduced to present value.59
My research showed how estimates of each of these two significant
components are often infected by race and gender bias-bias that is
hidden from view by statistics. Thus, the estimates of work-life expec-
tancy of women of all races and minority men are consistently lower
than estimates for white men. This is because work-life expectancy is
distinct from life expectancy. Work-life expectancy is a statistical
measure derived from the past working experience of all people in a
plaintiff's gender and racial group. It incorporates rates of unem-
ployment, both voluntary and involuntary, as well as expected retire-
ment age.6 Because women in the past stayed out of the workplace to
raise children, women have a lower work-life expectancy than men,
despite the fact that women generally live longer than men.61 Because
of higher rates of unemployment and of incarceration, minority men
also have a lower work-life expectancy than white men.6 Thus, based
on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the work-life expec-
tancy for a white man injured at the age of thirty was estimated to be
4.7 years more than that of a minority man, 8.7 years more than that
of a white woman, and 9.2 years more than that of a minority
woman.? Embedded within the seemingly neutral concept of "work-
life expectancy" is thus the history of unequal treatment of female
and minority workers, including the exclusion of married women
from employment and the relegation of minority men to sporadic
employment with little job security.
5" See 2 MARILYN MINZER ET AL, DAMAGES IN TORT AcTIONS § 10.22(3), at 10-64 to
10-90 (1997) (emphasizing that the reduction in the victim's capacity to earn rather
than the victim's actual earnings is what courts measure); Chamallas, supra note 15, at
79-81 (discussing standard formulations for calculating loss of earning capacity); Eve-
lyn Esther Zabel, Note, A Plain English Approach to Loss of Future Earning Capacity, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 253, 257-61 (1985) (demonstrating how to calculate loss of future earn-
ing capacity).
60 See Dale Funderburk, Worklife Tables: Are They Reliable?, TRIAL, Feb. 1986, at 44,
44-45 (discussing problems that arise in using standardized work patterns in statistical
analysis).
61 See 9 PAUL M. DEUTSCH & FREDERICK A. RAFFA, DAMAGES IN TORT AGTIONS
§ 110.13 tbls.7b.2 & 7b.5 (1997).
62 See i § 110.13 tbl.7b.2.
0 See id. § 110.13 tbls.7b.2 & 7b.5; see also Funderburk, supra note 60, at 44-45
(using 1977 data to find that work-life expectancy for women is 27.5 years, compared
with 37.9 years for men).
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Gender and race bias also affects the calculation of average wages.
When a plaintiff has no individualized track record of earnings,
economists acting as expert witnesses frequently resort to gender-
based and race-based tables of earnings to estimate future earnings.6
Because of wage discrimination and occupational segregation, predic-
tions of future earnings for women and minorities are considerably
lower than for white men, even when controlled for such factors as
educational attainment. Thus, the projected lifetime earnings, dis-
counted to 1990 present value, of a female college graduate have
been estimated to be only sixty-five percent of those of a similarly
situated male college graduate.65 The use of statistics in this context
means that current race and gender disparities in wages will be pro-
jected into the future, and that bias in the setting of wages will con-
tinue to influence personal injury and wrongful death awards.
In one respect, the use of gender- and race-based tables to deter-
mine future earning capacity is an example of ordinary disparate
treatment. Consider the case of twins-a boy and a girl-who are si-
multaneously severely injured in a car accident when they are chil-
dren. Under prevailing doctrine, the boy would be entitled to a con-
siderably higher recovery for loss of future earning capacity, solely
because of his gender. This is a classic case of disparate treatment of
similarly situated individuals, although few courts have found the
practice unlawful. 5
The use of gender- and race-based statistics is also, I believe, a
stark example of gender- and race-linked devaluation. Deep-seated
judgments about the importance of gender and race differences lie
beneath the use of the statistical disparities. In projecting future
See Chamallas, supra note 15, at 81-83 (discussing the assumptions made regard-
ing work, gender, and race).
See Interview with Richard Stevenson, Professor, College of Business Administra-
tion, University of Iowa, in Iowa City, Iowa (Aug. 25, 1993).
In the United States, only two recent cases have questioned the propriety of us-
ing gender- or race-based data as a matter of common law policy. SeeWheeler Tarpeh-
Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455-56 (D.D.C. 1991) ("[I]t would be inappro-
priate to incorporate current discrimination resulting in wage differences between the
sexes or races or the potential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for
damages resulting from lost wages."), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 995-97 (D.R.I. 1987) (calling defen-
dant's suggested 40% reduction of plaintiffs expected working life "disparate treat-
ment), modified 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding no clear error in the
court's refusal to accept defendant's gender-specific work statistics). I have argued
that the use of explicit race- or gender-based tables is unconstitutional. See Chamallas,
supra note 15, at 104-24.
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earning capacity, only a few characteristics of the plaintiff are rou-
tinely used as guides to predict the future-notably, age, sex, and
race. To some extent, it seems reasonable to rely on these factors to
calculate future earnings. A person's age does affect how long he or
she will likely be able to earn money and remain in the workforce. In
our society, moreover, race and gender do matter: Being a woman or
being an African-American does dampen one's earning prospects.
However, what is not often noticed is that many other variables, such
as religion, ethnicity, and marital status, also have predictive power,
yet are not used to predict earning potential. The use of race- and
67gender-based data is thus highly selective. And it is this selectivity
through which the process of devaluation takes place. The judgment
to focus on race and gender-but not other personal traits-amounts
to ajudgment that race and gender tell us more about what a person
will become, more about what a person is likely to achieve, than other
traits that have been correlated in the past with the acquisition of
wealth. Put another way, the categories of race and gender are
thought to be particularly salient, highly plausible predictors of future
earning capacity.
In the celebrated case City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,68 which chal-
lenged a gender-based pension benefit scheme under Title VII, Jus-
tice Stevens remarked on the selectivity of an employer's decision to
exact higher contributions to the pension fund from women workers.
Stevens argued that even though it was true that, on average, women
lived longer than men, the same could also be said for married men
versus single men. Yet the employer did not require married men to
make higher contributions.69 Nor did the employer base contribu-
tions on the worker's ethnicity or race, despite the documented dif-
ference in mortality rates for these groups. 70 Instead, the employer
singled out gender for special treatment, to the disadvantage of fe-
' A similar observation about the underinclusiveness of using sex-segregated actu-
arial tables to predict life expectancy when such variables as race and residence also
have predictive power was made in Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-
Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505,
511-13 (1980).
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
See id. at 710 n.18 (noting that married men tended to live 10 years longer than
unmarried men).
70 See id. at 709 n.15 (noting that life expectancy of blacks was 6.3 years shorter
than whites).
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male employees.7 Justice Stevens noted that in this context, employ-
ers were probably deterred from using race as a variable because it
was understood that the primary aim of Title VII was to make race ir-
relevant in employment decisions and, thus, it would have seemed
unreasonable to base an employee's take-home pay on race.7
A clue as to why economists and others might tend to select both
gender and race (but not other variables) when making predictions
about future income comes from social cognition theorists who have
examined biases in causal attribution. Causal attribution is a process
by which people connect cause and effect, or assign certain causes to
certain outcomes. In disciplines outside the law, there is a growing
appreciation that "[c] ausality is more than a scientific inquiry into the
state of the world .... [and] that people's perceptions and descrip-
tions of cause-and-effect relationships vary according to their time,
place, culture, and interest." 3 Historian Arthur McEvoy, for example,
has sought to distinguish the causal attribution process from quasi-
scientific notions of objective causation, arguing that "[h ] owever pas-
sionately people may believe that their customary patterns of causal
attribution are 'objective' and 'natural,' those patterns are, inescapa-
bly, historical artifacts."74
The causal attribution process is important in gaining an under-
standing of when we are inclined to blame the victim for her misfor-
tune, rather than to ascribe the outcome to some factor beyond the
victim's control. Reviewing the psychological studies, Linda Krieger
explains how the content of group stereotypes affects causal attribu-
tion.75 The empirical evidence indicates that in making causal judg-
ments, people often ascribe the cause of an action either internally
(to the actor herself) or externally (to forces outside the actor) 6
71 See id. at 711. The employer in Manhart also used gender as a variable selec-
tively. With respect to death benefits, it funded the program by equal contributions
from male and female employees, declining to give women the benefit of their longer
life span. See id. at 709 n.19. This one-way-street approach resembled the historical
practice of insurers charging blacks more for life insurance, but not less for disability
insurance. See id. at 709 n.16.
72 See id. at 709.
73 ARTHUR F. McEvoy, THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FACTORY FIRE OF 1911: SOCIAL
CHANGE, INDUSTRIAL AcCIDENTS, AND THE EvoLUTON OF COMMON-SENSE CAusALrrY 2
(American Bar Found. Working Paper Series No. 9315, 1994).
74 Id at 2-3.
" See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Emplyment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1204-
07 (1995).
76 See id. at 1204.
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There is a tendency, moreover, to attribute one's own behavior to ex-
ternal causes or situational factors.77 When evaluating another's ac-
tion, however, one is more likely to attribute it to dispositional factors,
such as the actor's personality, attitudes, or abilities" We are thus
more likely to blame the victim when we are not the victim.
This situational/dispositional dichotomy also operates with re-
spect to evaluating groups. Krieger explains that when an actor's be-
havior appears to confirm a stereotype about the actor's group, we at-
tribute that behavior to a dispositional factor within the control of the
actor.7 If the behavior is inconsistent with our stereotype of the
group, we are apt to seek out an external explanation and attribute
the behavior to situational factors."0 Thus, for example, if a black stu-
dent misses class, a white professor might unconsciously attribute the
absence to the black student's lack of commitment or to her irrespon-
sibility, in conformity with the professor's negative stereotypes about
blacks. When an older, white, male student misses class, however, the
same professor might assume that something special has happened,
perhaps a car accident or sickness, that prevented the student from
making it to class on that particular day. It is important to recognize
that the process by which we make such causal judgments may take
place instantaneously and unconsciously. The white professor may
not realize that her judgment was infected by racial bias.
There is a relationship, I believe, between the factors that are as-
sumed to be good predictors of the future and the situa-
tional/dispositional dichotomy. If the cause of an action is thought
to stem from a person's disposition, then it makes "sense" to predict
that the same behavior will occur in the future. In the prior example,
the professor might rationally predict that the "irresponsible" black
student will miss class again. When the cause is thought to be a
product of the situation, however, it makes sense to assume that the
same behavior likely will not occur unless the situation persists. Thus,
the professor in our example might reasonably predict that the white
student will probably make it to class the next day, unless there is an-
other car accident or sickness. Through this process, stereotypes
about a group not only distort present perceptions about behavior
but also prejudice our judgments about the future. These distortions
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may occur although the person making the judgment sincerely be-
lieves that she is making a rational prediction.
With respect to future earning capacity, the judgment to select
race and gender over other possible predictors may well be tainted by
cognitive bias. Thus, I suspect that even if the data clearly indicated
that, for example, Catholics on the average have higher incomes than
Baptists,8 judges and jurors would be loath to predict future earning
capacity based on religious denomination. The same could be said
for ethnicity. I doubt that, in a wrongful death case of a Japanese-
American child, a court would permit an expert witness to testify that
Japanese-Americans have higher incomes than the average college
graduate.ee Finally, I would be surprised if the marital status of a sin-
gle man was used against him in predicting his future income.
In each of these three examples, there would be a sense that us-
ing the variable of religion, ethnicity, or marital status was somehow
inappropriate, perhaps even offensive, despite its predictive value. It
is likely that judges and jurors would resist using these factors as a
guide to the future, even if they were helpful in explaining historical
patterns of income disparity. The social cognition studies lead me to
believe that we are more likely to regard disparities correlated with
religion, marital status, and, in some cases, ethnicity, as traceable to
situational rather than dispositional causes. Thus, in the 1990s, it
would seem unreasonable to ascribe a person's high earning power
simply to the fact that she is a Catholic. Instead, any disparity be-
tween Catholics and Baptists is more likely to be explained in terms of
8, This may well be the case. To investigate this hypothesis, my research assistant
and I used data from the General Social Surveys, a computerized database containing
large, nationally representative samples of individuals surveyed annually by the Uni-
versity of Michigan's Survey Research Center. For the most current years available
(1991, 1992, and 1994), we found that Catholics were almost one and one-half times
more likely than Baptists to have a household income of more than $25,000. Our
findings were based on a series of multiple regression equations which controlled for
sex, age, race, education, marital status, and work income. This preliminary study sug-
gests that religion is quite possibly a good predictor of income. See M. Douglas Scott,
Analysis Prepared for Professor Martha E. Chamallas (Sept. 1997) (unpublished re-
port, on file with author).
82 The example is plausible; the median per capita income forJapanese-Americans
in 1989 was $19,373, compared to $14,056 for all Americans. The median family in-
come forJapanese-Americans was $51,550, compared to $34,213 for all Americans. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
ASIANs AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 151 (1990) (summarizing data
for Japanese-Americans); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STA-




opportunities that were historically disproportionately available to
Catholics. We are more apt to believe that, as opportunity structures
change, the disparity between Catholics and Baptists will disappear,
and, thus, that religion is not a valid predictor of the future. It might
also seem unfair to saddle Baptists with the legacy of a past that had
little to do with the personal traits of Baptists as a people. When we
attribute the status of a group to external causes, we may be more
willing to anticipate a change in status, particularly if we believe that
America is not a rigidly stratified society and that there is a great deal
of class mobility.
Similarly, willingness to believe that race and gender are reliable
indicators of future earning capacity relates to causal attribution. If
women's low earning potential is thought to stem from women's
"natural" disposition to stay out of the workplace and care for the
house and children, this "trait" will also likely prevent women from
earning money in the future. Implicit in this judgment is the belief
that women are the cause of their own low incomes and that it is not
unfair to predict that this pattern will persist, given the nature of
women. Likewise, the use of race to predict future earnings signals a
willingness to ascribe the low incomes of African-Americans to inter-
nal factors, such as lack of motivation, lack of initiative, and lack of
intelligence.8s Such a focus on dispositional factors can conveniently
explain why the racial income gap will persist in the future, in spite of
the formal legal commitment to equal opportunity. If this is the case,
then negative stereotypes can become self-fulfilling prophecies as
predictions about future potential translate into lower damage
awards. In this way, causal attribution might, over time, transform
into "objective" causation.84
For an analysis of similar assumptions underlying the motivations and interests
of women and minority workers in Title VII suits challenging patterns of gender and
race segregation and hierarchy, see Schultz, supra note 53, at 1750 (discussing assump-
tions about women's job preferences that underlie judicial interpretation in Title VII
cases); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empiical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1073, 1180-81 (1992) (noting the incorporation of race and gender stereotypes
into Title VIIjurisprudence).
Historians also have begun to assess the importance of causal attribution to ex-
plain changes in popular thought about such phenomena as industrial accidents.
Prior to the late 19th century, judgments about responsibility for an accident focused
almost exclusively on the individual victim's behavior and events directly leading up to
the accident. A shift occurred when people began thinking in terms of longer chains
of causation and attributing responsibility to owners of factories, railroads, and other
enterprises for failing to maintain safe premises and safe procedures. The shift in
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In years past, lawyers and judges openly accepted the view that
damage awards for young female plaintiffs should be lower than for
male plaintiffs, simply because it was presumed that a woman would
marry, leave the workforce, and earn comparatively little in her life-
time. The value of a woman's potential was quite literally discounted
by these commonplace projections, while no such discount was ex-
acted from men who followed the same life path."' Additionally, ju-
ries instructed to take the race of a child into account in determining
a wrongful death award were given license to discount the potential of
African-American children, reflecting the commonly held view that
they would earn less in our racially stratified society.
8 6
These highly contested cultural assumptions currently are camou-
flaged by the use of statistics. Courts routinely rely on gender-based
tables, with little debate about whether it is fair to presume that
women will interrupt their careers for a substantial period of time to
raise children or whether the gender gap in wages will continue into
the indefinite future. Although race-based generalizations are con-
sidered anathema in other areas of the law,"7 they continue to distort
judgments about human potential when they take the form of statis-
tics based on past group-based experience. The past is uncritically
causal attribution changed the "common sense" of the matter and prompted an in-
crease in lawsuits by injured patrons, even in the absence of significant changes in
technology. See RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN
NEWYORK CrTY, 1870-1910, at 168-69 (1992) (attributing the increase in litigation in
New York City between 1870 and 1910 to the public acceptance of more attenuated
chains of causation); McEvoy, supra note 73, at 9 (positing that a famous 1911 indus-
trial accident, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire, increased the public's willingness to
attribute fault to employers rather than employees).
'5 See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.I. 1975) (using
shorter work-life expectancy and the discrepancy between male and female wages to
discount a female plaintiff's future earning capacity), affd, 548 F.2d 366 (Ist Cir.
1976); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (using like-
lihood of marriage as a factor in discounting future earning capacity of a female plain-
tiff), aff'd sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Chamallas,
supra note 15, at 90-95 (discussing these cases).
See, e.g., Powell v. Parker, 303 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (admitting
expert testimony which used race as a factor in computing the projected income of a
decedent in a wrongful death case).
Under equal protection standards, explicit race-based classifications are sub-
jected to the highest level of scrutiny, such that very few survive constitutional chal-
lenge. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny review should be applied to all racial classifications). As a matter of
formal doctrine, there is no defense to a finding of explicit disparate treatment based
on race under Title VII. The "bona fide occupational qualification" defense extends
only to sex, national origin, and religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1994).
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accepted as a guide to the future, even though most people acknowl-
edge that the past was hardly free of race and gender bias.
Most importantly, the selective use of statistics makes the process
of evaluation appear neutral and rational. Hidden from view is the
process by which we actively choose the factors we will use to predict
the future. Lawyers know that the answer to a question often depends
on how the question is framed. How we explain the past, particularly
how we ascribe cause to effect, influences our predictions of the fu-
ture. Implicit causal judgments that go to the heart of the enterprise
of making predictions are themselves influenced by stereotypes. I in-
terpret social cognition theory as teaching that predictions about the
future are also active constructions of the future. Causal attribution
can become material reality when perceptions are validated through
legal institutions, as happens when a judge or jury places a dollar
value on human potential. Cognitive bias distorts the interpretation
of the past to make biased predictions of the future seem rational and
fair. Devaluing the potential of women and minorities is thus accom-
plished in an updated, subtle form that looks more like economic ex-
pertise than race or gender bias.
II. IMPLICIT HIERARCHIES OFVALUES IN THE LAW OF TORTS
The three examples of devaluation discussed above suggest that
the processes of devaluation vary somewhat from context to context.
The judgment about the seriousness of a crime may be influenced by
the race of the victim of the crime. The importance we ascribe to a
particular type of job may depend on the gender of the prototypical
worker in thatjob. We may gauge the potential of a plaintiff accord-
ing to the past performance of others we deem to be "like" the plain-
tiff, focusing selectively only on factors that correspond to commonly
held views about the causes of social inequality. In each example,
however, race or gender-whether that of a crime victim, a majority of
jobholders, or a statistical group--is noticed and affects judgments
about relative worth. Devaluation operates at the cognitive level, in-
fluencing and shaping categories. However, devaluation also has ma-
terial consequences because, particularly in the law, categorization
crucially affects legal rights and liabilities.
In the past, critical scholars traced the devaluation process in spe-
cific tort doctrines. They focused, for example, on the exclusion of
women's perspectives in the development of the "reasonable man"
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standards and teased out the gender, race, and class bias in the de-
termination of what constitutes "outrageous" behavior.89 In this Arti-
cle, I wish to synthesize some of this critical scholarship to develop a
general theory about how the process of devaluation is accomplished
in the law of torts.
I start with a structural observation about the value the law places
on different types of injuries and types of damages. Although the
standard texts do not always state so explicitly, there is little question
that, in the contemporary law of torts, a higher value is placed on
physical injury and property loss than on emotional and relational
harm.' ° This implicit hierarchy of value was even more apparent in
an earlier era, when the scope of recovery in tort was more restricted
and there were even fewer possibilities for recovering for marginal
harms. Despite the liberalization of tort law, however, the basic hier-
archy has remained intact. Over time, new rationales have emerged
to justify privileging physical injury and property loss, coupled with
new concerns about expanding tort liability to cover a wider scope of
emotional or relational losses. More recently, moreover, it has be-
come increasingly clear that an implicit hierarchy of types of damages
has been constructed that complements the hierarchy of types of in-
jury. The trend is toward favoring or privileging pecuniary or eco-
nomic losses, such as lost wages or medical expenses, over nonpecu-
niary or noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering, mental
distress, lost companionship and society, loss of enjoyment of life, and
punitive damages.91
m See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 20-25 (1988) (advocating incorporation of feminist principles and perspec-
tives into the traditional "reasonable man" standard of care); Lucinda M. Finley, A
Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Cours, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 41,
57-65 (1989) (arguing that the "reasonable man" standard in tort law is suffused with a
male perspective, to the exclusion of female perspectives).
'9 See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional In-
fliction of EmotionalDistress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988) (discussing the effect of race,
gender, and class bias on employees' tort claims against their employers and advocat-
ing a more "worker-centric" theory of tort law).
90 My hierarchy of types of injuries does not include recovery in tort for pure eco-
nomic loss. To be sure, restrictive doctrines also limit liability for economic loss, simi-
lar to the restrictions on recovery for mental distress. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 1,
at 997-1002. However, because contract law provides considerable protection against
economic loss, it would be inaccurate to describe this type of harm as marginalized in
the law.
9' Among the states, there is some variation in the classification of damages as
economic or noneconomic. Economic loss clearly encompasses past and future wage
loss, past and future medical expenses, and expenditures for custodial care. See, e.g.,
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A. Ranking Types of Injuries
Until well into the twentieth century, the law purported to draw a
sharp line between physical injury and property loss on the one hand,
and mental distress and relational harm on the other. An 1861 Eng-
lish case, Lynch v. Knight,9 was often cited for the proposition that
mental disturbance alone did not qualify as a legally cognizable
harm. 3 When plaintiffs recovered for pain and suffering or other
mental distress associated with physical injuries, the courts were care-
ful to explain that these damages were "parasitic" and that the cause
of action was fundamentally based on physical injury.Y The ancient
intentional torts of assault, false imprisonment, and offensive battery,
which often compensated plaintiffs for nonphysical injury, were dis-
missed as exceptional cases. They provided protection against only
the narrowest range of harms (e.g., loss of liberty, fear of imminent
physical injury), and only to the extent necessary to assure that the
injured party or his relatives would not seek revenge through violent
retaliation.9'5
The recognition of tort causes of action based principally on
mental distress has been a slow and uneven process.9 The independ-
ent tort of intentional infliction of mental distress, free from any re-
quirement of proof of physical injury, was first incorporated into the
Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 115-16 (Md. 1992). Noneconomic loss clearly en-
compasses pain and suffering, mental distress stemming from physical impairment or
disfigurement, and loss of society, companionship, and affection of family members
and other intimates. Because loss of consortium sometimes may also include the eco-
nomic element of loss of domestic services, it can fit into both categories. See, e.g.,
Wolgang v. Mid-American Motorsports, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 434, 438-39 (D. Kan. 1996)
(classifying loss of domestic services as an economic loss). There has also been some
debate as to how loss of enjoyment of life should be categorized-whether the focus
should be on the injured person's subjective reaction to his or her changed situation,
or on the more objective valuation of the limitations on the person's life. See
McDougad v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989). Punitive damages do not eas-
ily fall into either category because they are designed to punish and deter, rather than
to compensate for injury.
11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861).
9" SeeKEETON ETAL, supra note 1, at 55 & n.3.
'4 See id. at 56-57 (stating that some independent tort, such as assault, would serve
as the peg upon which courts hung mental-distress damages).
9' SeeJOHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCMON TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1-2 (2d ed. 1985)
("Tort liability... provided a means whereby the victim of wanton aggression could be
'bribed' into abstaining from retaliation ... ."); FOWLERV. HARPERET AL, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 3.1, at 266-68 (2d ed. 1986) (documenting the history of battery).
9 The evolution of causes of action for emotional injuries is traced in Nancy Levit,
Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 136, 140-46 (1992).
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Restatement of Torts in 1948.9' This "new tort," however, is not yet
recognized in every state and is still approached cautiously by courts.
The threshold requirements that the defendant's action must be
"extreme and outrageous" and that the plaintiff's distress must be
"severe" serve as significant limitations on recovery. In theory at least,
the intentional infliction of the most trivial physical harm is a legal
wrong. With respect to emotional harm, however, the law responds
only to severe injuries and only if the wrongdoer is of the worst order
and deliberately oversteps the bounds of common decency.?
Not surprisingly, the law is even more unlikely to permit recovery
for negligent infliction of mental distress. Mostjurisdictions have re-
tained what is known as the "physical injury" or "physical manifesta-
tions" rule, which limits recovery to plaintiffs who can prove that their
emotional trauma had physical consequences." The courts regard
the physical injury requirement as a validation of the genuineness of
the emotional harm, and allow the presence of the higher-ranked
type of harm to lessen anxieties about expanding the boundaries of
tort recovery.101
Another limiting doctrine that has substantially curbed tort re-
covery is the "bystander rule"-the doctrine prohibiting recovery by
most persons who suffer trauma through witnessing the injury or
97 See id. at 142.
93 Pennsylvania, for example, has not yet explicitly recognized the tort. See
Kazatsky v. King David Mem'l Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 988-89 (Pa. 1987) (stating that
recovery for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress by outrageous conduct
had not been adopted by Pennsylvania courts); Small v.Juniata College, 682 A.2d 350,
355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting that at least one Pennsylvania court has held that the
"tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not recognized in Pennsylvania"),
appeal denied, 689 A.2d 235 (Pa. 1997).
9The oft-cited comment to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts pro-
vides:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to
an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
'0 Linda Kerber and I have traced the evolution of the restrictive rules limiting
recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress. See Martha Chamallas with Linda
K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 819-23
(1990) (discussingjudicial interpretations of the impact rule, the physical injury rule,
and the bystander rule, and their consequences for recovery for fright-based injuries).
'0' See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-81 (Mass. 1982); Reilly v.
United States, 547 A.2d 894, 896-97 (R.I. 1988).
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death of their children, family members, or other persons. °2 The
courts still struggle with imposing restrictions beyond the general
negligence requirement that some injury to the plaintiff be reasona-
bly foreseeable. Some courts limit recovery to only those plaintiffs in
the zone of physical danger.'03 More liberal courts allow close family
members outside the zone of danger to recover if they were present at
the scene of the accident and suffered harm from a direct emotional
impact.' In this comer of the law, the liberalizing trend heralded by
Dillon v. Legg,5' the famous 1968 California case, has apparently
ended; even California has retreated from a flexible, case-by-case ap-
proach to a more rule-bound regime designed to limit the number of
claims. '1
Over time, the rationales for limiting claims of mental distress
have shifted somewhat. Early cases tended to doubt the genuineness
of mental distress claims. 07 There were fears that plaintiffs could eas-
ily fake injuries and that it would be impossible to trace the invisible
causal chain from the accident to the plaintiff's injury.10 The courts
,02 See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 100, at 837-41, 851-58.
'03 See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 556 (1994)
(adopting the zone-of-danger test for use in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases). In
Consolidated Rail, Justice Thomas reported that the zone-of-danger test is used in 14
jurisdictions. See id. at 548.
'" For a discussion of the variety of limitations placed on bystander recovery, see
Dennis G. Bassi, Note, It'sAll Relative: A Graphical Reasoning ModelforLiberalizing Recov-
ery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Beyond the Immediate Family, 30 VAL U. L.
REV. 913, 929-49 (1996) (reviewing the expansion of the bystander recovery rule and
arguments for and against expansion).
10 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Dillon identified three factors that would serve as
guidelines to determine whether an injury was "reasonably foreseeable" and, thus,
compensable:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contem-
poraneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the ac-
cident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship.
Id. at 920.
'0 See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (replacing Dillon
guidelines with more explicit preconditions for recovery).
,07 See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 100, at 824-34 (tracing the rationale for
denying recovery in the early cases).
' See, e.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. 1958) (fearing a tremendous
number of illusory, imaginative, or faked claims and denying recovery for fright unac-
companied by physical injury or physical impact), overruled by Niederman v. Brodsky,
261 A.2d 84, 86-87 (Pa. 1970).
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also often faulted the plaintiff for not being "tougher," suggesting
that mental distress was more a function of the idiosyncrasies of the
victim than of the dangerous quality of the defendant's actions."0
These concerns about proof still sometimes surface today,"0 despite
the wealth of medical knowledge describing and documenting vari-
ous types of mental disturbances and widespread acknowledgment
that there is no bright line between physical and mental injury.'
In more recent decisions, however, the hesitation to award dam-
ages for mental distress is more often couched in terms of concerns
about disproportionate liability for defendants and the lack of a clear
stopping point for liability. For example, in a recent Supreme Court
opinion, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottsha, the Court held that the
Federal Employers' Liability Act provided no redress for a worker who
witnessed the negligent killing of a member of his crew, unless he
met the strict "zone of danger" requirement. The facts of the case
were appalling. The Conrail work-crew members, "most of them 50
to 60 years old and many of them overweight,"" 3 were required to
work virtually nonstop in ninety-seven degree weather. When one of
the plaintiffs good friends on the crew collapsed, the plaintiff and
other coworkers rushed to his side. They were ordered back to work
by the crew supervisor. Five minutes later, the plaintiffs friend had a
heart attack and died before the plaintiff's eyes. The supervisor
"ordered the men back to work, within sight of [his] covered body."" 4
Despite these compelling facts, the Court concluded that a strict
limit on liability was necessary, even though the factfinder in such a
case would no doubt regard the plaintiff's distress as genuine and se-
rious."5 The "more significant problem," in the majority's view (as
written by Justice Clarence Thomas), was the prospect of imposing
"nearly infinite liability" on defendants for genuine claims brought by
'09 See, e.g., Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 517 (N.J. 1966) (concluding that
a heart attack was an idiosyncratic reaction of plaintiff and ruling that there was no
basis for recovery).
110 See, e.g., Maloney v. Conroy, 545 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Conn. 1988) (denying recov-
ery for emotional disturbance in a medical malpractice bystander case because of con-
cerns about proof and fears of trivial and falsified claims).
' See Levit, supra note 96, at 186 ("While medical science persistently explores the
interrelation of psychic and physiological states, law stubbornly resists the link.").
112 512 U.S. 532, 558 (1994).
"s Id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"4 Id. at 536.
See id. at 550-51 (rejecting the Third Circuit's test, which only required evidence
of a likelihood of genuine and serious emotional injury).
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plaintiffs.116  Justice Thomas stressed that, unlike physical harm
caused through impact, injuries produced through the mechanism of
fear or other distress can occur far from the time and place of the
original accident."
7
Although I disagree strongly with the result in Gottshall, the ad-
ministrative concern for line-drawing in mental distress cases is not
groundless. In recent years, courts have been faced with new types of
mental distress cases, in which, for example, plaintiffs seek recovery
for their fear of contracting serious diseases such as AIDS or hepati-
tis."" Plaintiffs now even sue for the trauma associated with causing
injury, as when, for example, the driver of a car who accidentally runs
over a child pedestrian sues for his or her own guilt and anguish at
being the agent of death." 9 Given the proliferation of new claims,
courts cannot escape the necessity of drawing a line at some point.
My argument is that they should determine that point with an aware-
ness of the disparate impact of the rules they select.
The question is not whether the law will provide any compensa-
tion for genuine mental distress. Some legal protection already ex-
ists, and has existed for quite some time. When plaintiffs urge recog-
nition of a new claim for emotional distress, they often stress that
there is no comprehensive ban on recovery and highlight the illogic
of incomplete coverage."O Why, for example, will the law permit re-
116 Id. at 552.
117 See id. at 545 ("Emotional injuries may occur far removed in time and space
from the negligent conduct that triggered them."). The Court cited Richard N.
Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the
Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FL.4 L. REV. 477, 507 (1982) for the observation that
"[tihe geographic risk of physical impact caused by the defendant's negligence in
most cases is quite limited, which accordingly limits the number of people subjected to
that risk. There is no similar finite range of risk for emotional harm." GottshalZ, 512
U.S. at 545 n.4.
"" See Karen L. Chadwick, Fear of AIDS. The Catalyst for Expanding Judicial Recogni-
tion of a Duty to Prevent Emotional Distress Beyond Traditional Bounds, 25 N.M. L. REV. 143,
143 (1995) ("[T]he combination of fear and a deadly disease has led to a number of
lawsuits where the fearful party has sought compensation for emotional distress; thus,
the 'AIDSphobia' cases were born.").
"9 See, e.g., Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 578 (La. 1990)
(allowing recovery for emotional distress to motorist who struck and killed a child who
was exiting a school bus); Guillory v. Arceneaux, 580 So. 2d 990, 997 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (permitting plaintiff motorist to recover damages for mental anguish resulting
from her running over a pedestrian).
'20 Reviewing the evolution of the claim for negligent infliction of mental distress,
Professor David Robertson has noted the logic in the "seemingly inexorable move-
ment from liberalisation to further liberalisation" that plaintiffs often invoke. David
W. Robertson, Liability in Negligence for Nervous Shock, 57 MOD. L REV. 649, 654 (1994).
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covery for mental distress when a defendant acts intentionally, but not
when the claim is for negligent infliction?12' Or why may relatives re-
cover when a defendant mishandles a family member's corpse,s but
not when a defendant negligently kills a family member before their
eyes? Concerns about fake injuries, the hypersensitive plaintiff, and
tracing cause and effect are often no more difficult in these contested
contexts than in those contexts in which recovery has already been
permitted.ls Even those commentators who are loath to extend liabil-
ity tend to recognize that these old arguments about problems of" 121
proving mental injury are now "regarded with some suspicion.
Rather, the crucial policy choices have to do with when to provide
compensation, that is, in which contexts the genuine mental distress
suffered by victims is so compelling that it deserves recognition in law.
This complicated policy choice is hindered, rather than aided, by the
existing hierarchy of types of injuries. There is no blanket guarantee
that physical harm will be worse than emotional harm or that injury
to property will create more suffering than injury to relationships,
particularly when we realize that the severity of harm depends in part
on the social situation of the victim. Indeed, the disabled child who
loses the care and guidance of her only parent because of another's
negligence may suffer a more grievous loss than the wealthy business
owner whose building is destroyed. The need to draw the line some-
where gives no guidance as to the wisdom of the current limitations.
Under the surface of the administrative objections to extending
liability for mental distress probably lies a more fundamental objec-
tion about the desirability of affording monetary compensation for
Robertson, however, argues for more caution, expressing concern about"the slippery
slope" of increasing liability, especially difficulties in judicial administration. Id at
655.
1, See the plaintiff's arguments for recovery for negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress suffered by bystanders in Dillon v. Leg 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (arguing
that reasonable foreseeability is the norm for recovery in negligence claims, and that it
is reasonably foreseeable that a mother will be in close proximity and will suffer emo-
tional distress upon witnessing her child's accident).
22 Recovery for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress in connection
with the mishandling of a corpse has long been available in mostjurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283 (Me. 1987) (permitting a
cause of action for the negligent infliction of severe emotional distress after a son
found a leg of his recently deceased father in a bag believed to contain his father's
personal belongings).
125 See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, SpousalEmotionalAbuse as a Tort?
55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1298-1301 (1996) (acknowledging significant problems with tra-
ditional explanations for limiting recovery in emotional distress cases).
124 Id. at 1299.
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emotional distress, even when it is clear that plaintiff's injuries are
genuine, sufficiently serious to warrant legal attention, and properly
attributable to the defendant's wrongful conduct. Many people recoil
from reducing emotions and relationships to a dollar figure, and con-
sider it degrading and perhaps even immoral to evaluate human life
and human relationships according to commercial measureslss The
popular cynicism surrounding the tort system may in part reflect the
belief that plaintiffs who seek large sums for intangible injuries are
the least deserving, that their very willingness to exploit the system is
a testament to the superficiality of their injury.
A standard response to this "money cannot buy love" argument
against damages for emotional distress is that it is too late to complain
about such a basic feature of the torts system, unless one is prepared
to do away with large areas of tort liability. Few people would now
question whether there ought to be a cause of action for the wrongful
death of children, although many once hesitated to commodify the
parent-child relationship by placing a monetary value on children's
lives. 12 Further, courts now generally agree that parents ought to be
afforded some recovery in wrongful-birth claims, at least to offset the
extraordinary expenses of raising a disabled child.ss The fear that
tort judgments will stigmatize children and diminish the value of the
parent-child relationship has generally given way in the face of the
need for compensation and a sense that exonerating defendants in
in See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POUTICS OF LAWv, supra note 17, at 326, 344
("Nonpecuniary damages also dehumanize the response to misfortune, substituting
money for compassion, arousingjealousy instead of sympathy, and treating experience
and love as commodities.").
'2 See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36
U. RA L. REV. 333, 399-408 (1984) (arguing that similarities between the causes and
symptoms of psychic injury and physical pain make it arbitrary to deny recovery for
psychic harm).
'27 SeeVIVIANAA. ZEIJZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 113-37 (1985) (discussing
the controversy surrounding insuring children's lives); cf. Steven P. Crowley &Jon D.
Hanson, The Nonpecuniay Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-SufferingDamages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1906-14 (1995) (suggesting that society is willing to endorse tort
compensation for pain and suffering even when it would seem undesirable to insure
against such losses).
"3 See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988) (holding that
in a wrongful-birth action, parents may recover at least extraordinary medical and
educational expenses involved in raising their son); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d
345, 351 (Nev. 1995) (establishing the availability of damages for a parent's emotional
distress and the extraordinary medical and custodial care expenses involved in raising
a severely disabled child); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813-14 (N.Y. 1978)
(permitting the plaintiffs in a wrongful-birth suit to recover for pecuniary loss incurred
in the care and treatment of a child until her death, but not for emotional injuries).
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such cases would be unjust."' In short, the fact that money is inade-
quate compensation does not mean that denial of recovery is prefer-
able. Money damages may be the best we can do.
The question of whether or not to provide money compensation
for emotional harm poses a classic "dilemma of difference.'3 If
courts legally recognize such claims and award damages, they risk
commodifying and depersonalizing emotions and relationships.'
3'
This danger is of particular concern for feminists, because women
have taken on the lion's share of the emotional work in our society
and are more frequently the caretakers of children, elderly parents,
and other dependent persons. The irony is that legal recognition
of injury may serve to trivialize, or at least distort, women's suffering.
One eloquent critic of affording money damages for emotional
and relational injuries, for example, has expressed the concern that
such awards send the message that "[a]ll relationships have a mone-
tary equivalent and hence can be bought and sold.""3 The award of
damages may further imply that it is appropriate to rank intimate re-
lationships along "a single scale," based on the assumption "that an
impaired partner will be discarded, like any other consumer product
in our throwaway society.""' The award of tort damages must prompt
us to ignore the special, individualized qualities of relationships.
On the other hand, if we do not give adequate legal recognition
to claims for emotional harm, women's suffering may become invisi-
ble, and the material hardships women face will certainly not be re-
duced by denying monetary relief. The dilemma arises because both
strategies have the potential to backfire and harm the "different"
group in the process.
Double binds or dilemmas of difference such as this have been
described by philosopher Marilyn Frye as one of the "most character-
'29 See, e.g., Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 1990) (stating that
allowing parents to recover for wrongful birth will enhance rather than disparage the
emotional well-being of the entire family).
"o The theorist who coined the phrase "dilemma of difference" is Martha Minow.
The fullest elaboration of Minow's analysis of this phenomenon is MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990).
'3' For a discussion of the dangers of commodification, see MargaretJane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1870-87 (1987) (discussing problems as-
sociated with commodification, such as alienation of human beings and loss of per-
sonal autonomy).
'32 See infra text accompanying notes 185-86.




istic and ubiquitous features of the world as experienced by op-
pressed people. "'Is Given the social inequality of women in the mar-
ketplace and in larger society, it is hardly surprising that the policy
choices offered in this area of tort law each carry potential hazards.
The commodification dilemma posed with respect to damages for
emotional distress is not intrinsic to tort law, but stems from women's
marginal status in our culture.
When faced with dilemmas of difference, feminist scholars have
tried to escape the horns of the dilemma by scrutinizing the terms
underlying the basic choices. 's The way out of the dilemma of differ-
ence related to emotional distress claims is not to choose either
commodification or legal nonrecognition, but to question whether
and why legal recognition must result in commodification in the spe-
cific context My hypothesis is that legal claims for emotional distress
have been devalued in part because they are associated with female
plaintiffs. In a less biased, more inclusive tort system, claims for dam-
age to emotions and relationships would not be viewed either as
property rights or commodities, on the one hand, or as lacking in
value, on the other. Instead, in a specific context, the decision to
recognize a right to compensation would depend more on whether
the law wished to validate the damaged relationship or to acknowl-
edge the reasonableness of a plaintiff's emotional response. If the
balance was not so weighted against emotional harm in the first place,
the Supreme Court's ruling in Gottshall, for example, might have
turned on whether the law ought to encourage coworkers to care for
and worry about each other's safety and health or whether it is rea-
sonable for employees to be distressed when they are ordered to work
around the corpse of a fellow worker.
37
With respect to the classification of mental distress as a type of
harm worthy of legal notice, the law has gradually moved from no
recognition to partial recognition. Categorical denials of recovery
MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REAL1TY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIsT THEORY 2 (1983).
" The feminist refusal to accept the terms of the dichotomy and instead to break
the dichotomy by seeing the interconnectedness of seemingly opposite terms is well
illustrated by the scholarship of Elizabeth Schneider. See generally Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 387, 395 (1993) ("[V]ictimization and agency are not extremes in opposition:
they are interrelated dimensions of women's experience."); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L
REV. 589, 601-04 (1986) (explaining that feminist theory is rooted in a dialectical
process in which "the 'private' and 'public' worlds are inextricably linked").
137 See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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have been replaced by a welter of special, onerous requirements
placed on recovery of this "nonprivileged" type of harm. It has not
been a straight-line trend toward liberalization. Instead, the high-
water mark for plaintiffs probably was reached in the 1970s, before
the more conservative reaction in the 1980s led to successive waves of
tort reforms favoring defendants.Is The many doctrinal develop-
ments have not, however, dislodged the basic hierarchy. It is still
much easier to recover for physical injury and property loss than for
mental distress.
Like emotional harms, relational injuries continue to rank at the
bottom of the legal hierarchy of injuries. At different historical peri-
ods, certain relational claims have gained visibility, but there has
never been widespread legal protection for this type of injury. Many
of the old intentional torts which sought to protect intimate and fam-
ily relationships, such as criminal conversation,' seduction, 4 ' breach
of a promise to marry, ' and alienation of affections, have either
been abolished'4 or have little impact in the law. Notably, there has
been no development comparable to the emergence of the tort of in-
tentional infliction of mental distress that provides general protection
133 Developments in California are emblematic of the more general trend. The
flexible, plaintiff-oriented approach to bystander recovery for mental distress in Dillon
v. Legg 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), was replaced by the more restrictive, rule-bound ap-
proach in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). For discussion of these hold-
ings, see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
"09 See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 829
(6th ed. 1996) ("[Twenty] states have abolished the action entirely either legislatively
or judicially."). For a recent decision rejecting the claim, see Neal v. Nea4 873 P.2d
871, 874 (Idaho 1994) (noting the outdated rationale behind the tort of criminal con-
versation and abolishing it).
140 SeeJane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature Deceit":
A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 401 (1993) (describing the
"handful" of reported seduction cases brought since 1960); Lea VanderVelde, The Le-
gal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 867-68 (1996) (discussing the historical ba-
sis for the tort of seduction).
"' See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 786-87, 830-35 (1988) (stating that suits brought for breach of
promise to marry fell into disfavor in the early half of this century).
142 See Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992) (abolishing the tort of inten-
tional interference with the marital relation because of its similarity to the already-
discredited action for alienation of affections).
14 See Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1770, 1770-71
(1985) (noting that many states have either enacted "heartbalm" statutes, abolishing
these types of actions, or have passed laws limiting them).
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against intentional interference with important relationships.1" Al-
though there has been some modest growth in the recognition of
negligent infliction of relational injury, the law is still characterized by
discrete, narrowly bounded causes of action.
The two most important contemporary legal bases for compensa-
tion for negligent interference with relationships-wrongful death
and loss of consortium---did not exist in their current form at com-
mon law. Relatives had no common law right to recover for wrongful
death of a family member.'" Claims arising from nonfatal injuries
were limited to a husband's claim for loss of his wife's services, sex,
and society, and a father's claim for loss of his child's services. Both
claims were likened to a master's claim for deprivation of his servant's
services and characterized as a material loss to the "owner."'" Both
claims were also given only to the dominant party: A wife or child suf-
fered no legally cognizable relational injury. 47 The one-sided nature
of these claims made it difficult to characterize them as relational in-
juries, at least insofar as relational harms rest on a recognition of in-
'1 Conceivably, claims for sexual and racial harassment in the workplace could be
regarded as claims for intentional interference with plaintiff's employment relation-
ship. Victims of harassment by coworkers and supervisors, however, most often bring
claims for intentional infliction of mental distress, precisely because there is no other
widely recognized tort cause of action for such relational harm. The tort of inten-
tional interference with the employment relationship has traditionally been used by
employers to prevent other employers from stealing away valuable employees or to
prevent third parties from pressuring the employer to fire the plaintiff-employee. Re-
cent cases have occasionally extended the claim to allow an employee to sue a supervi-
sor who induces the employer to fire the employee. SeeSULLIVAN ET AL, supra note 53,
at 829-41 (discussing recent case law involving claims for intentional interference with
the employment relationship).
145 The English rule denying recovery was first enunciated in Baker v. Bolton, 170
Eng. Rep. 1033, 1033 (KLB. 1808) ("[T]he death of a human being could not be com-
plained of as an injury; and in this case the damages, as to the plaintiff's wife, must
stop with the period of her existence."). Partial recovery was first afforded to depend-
ents of the deceased by Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict.,
ch. 93 (Eng.) (providing a cause of action for wrongful death). The developments in
the United States are canvassed in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
384-93 (1970) (tracing the history of the treatment of wrongful death suits in the
United States from the adoption of the English rule denying recovery, to the adoption
of a wrongful death statute in all 50 states). Similar to the reservations expressed in
extending recovery for purely mental distress claims, opponents of wrongful death
actions expressed fears that allowing recovery would lead to "runaway damages" and
that it was "immoral" to place a value on human life. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL,
PROSSER, WADE AND SCHwARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 449-550 (9th ed.
1994).
146 See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
147 See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 556-59 (Mass. 1973) (tracing the his-
tory of the spousal consortium claim).
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terdependency among persons, distinct from both individual prop-
erty rights and emotional harm.
Under current negligence law, courts routinely allow claims for
wrongful death14 and spousal consortium on a gender-neutral basis.
14 9
In its updated form, the loss-of-spousal-consortium claim has lost its
property-like character, especially because most states now hold that
the primary accident victim, rather than the consortium claimant, has
the right to recover for loss of household services.'50 Nonetheless, it is
still fair to say that recovery for relational injuries remains at the outer
margins of the law.
In most states there is no cause of action for the loss of compan-
ionship and society of family members other than spouses. Consis-
tent protection for loss of consortium of children, parents, grandpar-
ents, and siblings is notably lacking. 5' Recovery virtually never
extends beyond traditional relationships.,52 Even legal commentators
rarely debate the merits of affording compensation for relational in-
juries to the partners in same-sex or other nonmarital relationships,
or for damage to life-long friendships. In life, the existence and qual-
ity of these intimate human relationships may well be essential to a
person's happiness and well-being. Tort law, however, generally
treats relational injuries merely as supplemental to "primary" claims
for physical harm, serving principally to increase the total recovery for
the family unit.
"'4 The scope of the wrongful death claim depends on the particulars of the spe-
cific state statute authorizing recovery. See MALONE, supra note 1, at 29-44 (discussing
pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements of damages).
9 See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 139, at 250 (noting that "virtually all states
have come to recognize the loss of consortium action for both spouses"). Utah is an
exception to the near-universal recognition of loss of spousal consortium. See
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286-87 (Utah 1987) (rejecting
cause of action).
,o See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1(5), at 660 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that
today, only the injured spouse should recover for loss of services because each spouse
has the right to his or her own efforts and the products of those efforts).
"' Dan Dobbs reports that approximately a dozen states allow children to sue for
the loss of parental consortium. When a child is injured, the parents' claim is gener-
ally limited to recovery for loss of services; only a few states allow the parents to recover
for loss of society and companionship when the child survives. See DAN B. DOBBS,
TORTs AND COMPENSATION 437-38 (2d ed. 1993). Louisiana may be the only state to
permit grandparents and siblings to recover for loss of consortium. However, their
claims are recognized only if the person suffering physical injury has no surviving
spouse, children, or parents. SeeLA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997).
152 See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (denying loss-of-
consortium recovery to unmarried cohabitants).
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The hierarchy of types of injuries is perhaps most evident in the
typical law school curriculum, particularly if we focus on what is left
out as well as what is covered in the classroom. My impression is that
most first-year torts courses focus almost exclusively on the
"privileged" types of injury, omitting extensive discussion of such top-
ics as wrongful death, loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of
mental distress.5 The message is that "real" injuries involve physical
harm and loss of property and that we should be more skeptical about
the legitimacy or worth of claims of emotional loss or relational in-
jury.
B. Ranking Types of Damages
The implicit hierarchy of types of damages, which ranks pecuni-
ary over nonpecuniary damages, is of more recent origin than the hi-
erarchy of injuries. At first blush, this hierarchy may appear to dupli-
cate the hierarchy of types of injuries in that both privilege tangible
over intangible harms. However, it is important to note at the outset
that many types of injuries give rise to both pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary damages. Thus, for example, plaintiffs who suffer physical in-
jury not only seek recovery for pecuniary damages consisting of medi-
cal expenses, wage loss, and loss of future earning capacity, but also
for nonpecuniary damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoy-
ment of life. A plaintiff suing for negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress is likely also to have medical expenses and loss of income; a
wrongful death beneficiary may recover for loss of pecuniary support
and maintenance as part of the relational injury.'54 The hierarchy of
damages thus operates within the categories of types of harm to give
higher priority to the pecuniary or economic aspects of the damage
claim.
The implicit hierarchy of damages is most evident in statutory
proposals for tort reform and judicial pronouncements rejecting chal-
lenges to reform measures. Beginning with the movement for work-
ers' compensation, tort reform has most often targeted nonpecuniary
"3 Particularly now that many law schools have reduced torts from a six-credit, full-
year course to a three- or four-credit, one-semester course, the pressure to cut down
on coverage is intense. The excellent casebook I currently use devotes only 31 pages
to negligent infliction of emotional distress, with only "note" treatment of loss of con-
sortium. SeeFRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 139, at 226-57.
"4 Claims for loss of property, however, will only rarely include a mental distress
element of damages. Once shorn of the services element, loss-of-consortium claims
may also consist entirely of nonpecuniary losses.
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damages, suggesting that these damages are somehow less essential to
a fair system of compensation than damages for economic loss. l s To
be sure, workers' compensation and automobile no-fault schemes
were not designed to disfavor plaintiffs: the quid pro quo for giving
up noneconomic loss was a quicker recovery for plaintiffs who were
no longer saddled with the difficult task of proving negligence. Nev-
ertheless, these insurance systems reflected a choice to curtail recov-
ery for nonpecuniary loss, and thus implicitly set a higher priority on
recovery for pecuniary loss.
The two more recent waves of tort reforms-those spurred by the
medical malpractice "crisis" of the 1970s and the litigation explosion
of the 1980s--clearly follow the damages hierarchy. Together, they
provided the political impetus for a variety of statutory caps on
noneconomic damages, particularly in actions against health care
providers. By 1990, some kind of cap or limit had been enacted in
well over half of the states, some extending to all personal injury
suits.'s Most recently, there has been growing support for federal leg-
islation that would force all the states to cap noneconomic losses in
health-care-liability actions.!57
This sharp curtailment on noneconomic damages, particularly
without the quid pro quo found in earlier reforms, has prompted
constitutional challenges based on various grounds, including the
rights to jury trial, equal protection, due process, and access to the
courts. So far, the results are mixed, with no clear determination of
the legality of caps's8 However, the debate has provided an occasion
for some courts to validate the legislative priorities and express a clear
preference for economic damages over noneconomic damages.
Thus, in upholding a statutory cap, the California Supreme Court
voiced its approval of the position taken in an ABA report on medical
malpractice which flatly declared that "'the first priority of the tort
system is to compensate the injured party for the economic loss he
has suffered.'" 159 It further impugned the status of noneconomic
' See Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women,
64 TENN. L. REV. 847, 850 (1997) ("Nonpecuniary loss damages have been a favorite
target of tort reformers, singled out as a seemingly easy mark.").
' SeeDOBB5, supra note 151, at 792-93.
15 7 See infra notes 219-27.
"s' See DOBBS, supra note 150, § 8.8, at 686-87 (noting that it is easier to sustain con-
stitutional challenge if the cap targets only noneconomic damage).
"9 Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 681 n.17 (Cal. 1985) (quoting
Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Medical Professional Liability, 102 A.B.A. REP. 849 (1979)). The
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damages by asserting that, despite being well-established in the law,
noneconomic damages were suspect. Citing legal commentators and
a dissenting opinion by Justice Traynor,16' the court stated:
Thoughtful jurists and legal scholars have for some time raised serious
questions as to the wisdom of awarding damages for pain and suffering
in any negligence case, noting, inter alia, the inherent difficulties in
placing a monetary value on such losses, the fact that money damages
are at best only imperfect compensation for such intangible injuries and
that such damages are generally passed on to, and borne by, innocent
161
consumers.
The New York Court of Appeals expressed similar sentiments
when it held that there could be no recovery for loss of enjoyment of
life unless the plaintiff had "some cognitive awareness."162 This time
the court downgraded recovery for noneconomic loss by asserting
that it "stands on less certain ground than does an award for pecuni-
ary damages," and rests on the "legal fiction" that money damages can
compensate for such harms as pain and suffering and loss of enjoy-
ment of life.lss
The judicial mistrust of noneconomic damages has been echoed
by the torts establishment, particularly by those who approach torts
from a "law and economics" bent.16 Their influence has been felt by
ABA report denounced caps on economic damages but took no position on the pro-
priety of capping noneconomic losses. SeeTondel, supra.
'6' See Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 344-47 (Cal. 1961)
(Traynor,J., dissenting). BecauseJustice Traynor is most often credited with liberaliz-
ing recovery for plaintiffs, his position in Seffert might seem odd. However, in that
case, he did not argue that recovery for pain and suffering should generally be scaled
back, but simply that the plaintiff's award was excessive. He did characterize nonpe-
cuniary awards as "increasingly anomalous" in a modern mechanized society in which
losses are distributed through insurance and in which the costs of accidents are passed
on to consumers through price increases. See id. at 345. Thus, Traynor's fondness for
"enterprise liability"-most often connected to his willingness to impose strict liability
on product manufacturers and other businesses-led him to distrust nonpecuniary
damages as less susceptible to an insurance model of tort liability.
161 Fein, 695 P.2d at 680-81. The commentators cited were Clarence Morris, Marcus
L. Plant, Louis L.Jaffe, and William Zelermyer. Seeid. at 681.
162 McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989).
163 Id.
164 The most common argument put forward by economics-minded scholars is the
"optimal insurance" view. Proponents of this view argue that the value of pain and suf-
fering should be measured by whether a person would have bargained for and paid for
insurance against such a loss. The economists then reason that such a bargain would
not be rational because money is worth less to a person in an injured state than it is to
a healthy person. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INsT., R EPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRIsE RE-
SPONSIBILITy FOR PERSONAL INJURY 207 (1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE RESPONSI-
BILITY] ("[We have no reason to suppose that in their injured state they would actu-
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the American Law Institute, as evidenced by a 1991 report addressing
awards for pain and suffering. '6 The authors' commitment to the hi-
erarchy of damages is most evident in the structure they selected to
examine the issue. The report deals at length with the question of
whether there should be any award for pain and suffering, discussing
the possible abolition of noneconomic damages quite seriously.'66 Al-
though the authors fall short of recommending total abolition,'67 they
include no comparable discussion of the wisdom of expanding recov-
ery for noneconomic damages. The report contains no treatment, for
example, of whether the law fails to compensate for important
noneconomic losses experienced by victims of negligence or other
fault. What is presented as a balanced discussion of the issues is actu-
ally quite skewed. The wisdom of the hierarchy of damages is largely
presumed, with the focus on the more limited question of how far the
law should cut back on its traditional rules governing noneconomic
loss.168
The latest academic skirmish over the propriety of noneconomic
damages has generated a wider debate over the nature of compensa-
tion generally, particularly whether money damages are appropriate
when an injury, such as the loss of society of a child, is not reducible
to a monetary figure.1m These days, defendant-oriented commenta-
ally enjoy the money any more than they would while they were healthy."). These as-
sumptions are challenged in Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Pfice on Pain and Suffering: A
Method for HelpingJuries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L REV.
775, 794-96 (1995) (noting that the pain-and-suffering injury may either increase, de-
crease, or not affect the individual's ability to derive satisfaction from money after the
accident). Recently, law-and-economics scholars have also argued that consumers may
in fact demand insurance against nonpecuniary losses. See Steven P. Croley &Jon D.
Hanson, TheNonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain and SufferingDamages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1835-45 (1995) (discussing "nonmarket" evidence of consumer
demand for pain-and-suffering insurance). For a critique of the optimal insurance
view, see MargaretJane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE LJ. 56, 75-
80, 77 (1993) ("[It may be that people reject the idea of purchasing insurance be-
cause they reject the symbolism of the transaction.").
165 See2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 164.
'6' See 2 id. at 204-17 (discussing the "uneasy case for pain and suffering").
167 The study recommends that damages for pain and suffering be limited to those
victims who suffer "significant injuries" and thatjuries should be provided with disabil-
ity profiles which rank or scale injuries from the relatively moderate to the gravest.
Dollar amounts would be attached to the profile to be used as guidelines for setting
damage awards. See 2 id. at 230.
168 See 2 id. at 204-30 (discussing the rationale for excluding much of what is now
compensable noneconomic loss).
169 The debate has been cast as whether some values are "incommensurable" in the
sense that they cannot be precisely measured by the same scale. Professor Cass Sun-
stein has stated that "[i]ncommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be
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tors most often stress the imprecision of nonpecuniary awards and ar-
gue that they do not really serve the purpose of restoring plaintiffs to
the position they were in before the accident.7 Those scholars less
committed to downsizing tort judgments emphasize the expressive
function of law. They stress that tort judgments are not only about
money, even though the award of damages is the principal tort rem-
edy. Instead, they argue, a judgment also functions as a way of dem-
onstrating the importance we place on human relationships and on
legal rights. These interests may deserve legal recognition, even
though they may lack precise market valuation.1
7
1
Not surprisingly, the debate about nonpecuniary loss echoes
many of the arguments and counterarguments surrounding the de-
bate about recovery for emotional distress. The debates have evolved
in similar ways: The older skepticism about the genuineness of non-
pecuniary injury surfaces less frequently, and the judicial sentiment
that only weak or idiosyncratic plaintiffs suffer this type of harm is less
apparent in recent cases. Contemporary courts, for example, are less
likely to ask the rhetorical question: "What manly mind cares about
pain and suffering that is past?"'
Instead, the current controversy seems fixated on the lack of
measurability of nonpecuniary loss and the commodification di-
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments
about how these goods are best characterized." Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 796 (1994).
'70 See Randall Ri. Bovbjerg et al., ValuingLife and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 909-27 (1989) (offering reasons why the current
method of assessing damages should be changed). Earlier commentators had a more
"no-fault" orientation, arguing that pain and suffering should be abolished as a quid
pro quo for eliminating the need to prove negligence. Professor Louis Jaffe's classic
article advocating a cautious approach to nonpecuniary damages starts with the asser-
tion that tort liability has already shifted from a fault-based regime to one resting on
concepts of insurability. See Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of In-
surance, 18 LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (1953) ("If plaintiff has suffered injury of
the foreseeable type, it seems that insurability is a much better reason for compensa-
tion than fault in the pallid sense in which it is now understood.").
7 See Finley, supra note 155, at 849 (discussing the importance of the "social func-
tions" of tort law); Thomas C. Galligan,Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CoRNELLJ.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 139, 171-75 (1996) (discussing the manner in which tort litigation and, specifi-
cally, damage awards are centered on the personalized consideration of the particular
plaintiff's plight); Radin, supra note 164, at 83-86 (discussing the importance of the
culture-shaping function of law); Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reas-
sessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 788-89 (1987)
(discussing the importance of legal recognition of noneconomic loss); Sunstein, supra
note 169, at 795-812 (discussing the incommensurability of noneconomic loss).
'7 The Mediana, 1900 App. Cas. 113, 117 (Eng.), quoted inJOHN G. FLEMING, AN
INTRODUGCON TO THE LAW OF TORTS 127 (1968).
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lemma, as discussed above.17  Reminiscent of the mental in-
jury/physical injury distinction, there is a tendency to discuss the two
types of damages as if they were dichotomous, exaggerating both the
ease of measuring pecuniary losses and the difficulty of precisely
measuring nonpecuniary losses. Thus, it is not always acknowledged
that it is often very difficult to calculate loss of future earning capac-
ity74 or other future pecuniary losses. Nor is it always understood that
damages for pain and suffering are not wholly unpredictable, but
rather depend to a significant degree on the severity of the injury.'
Undoubtedly there is considerable variation among different ju-
ries in their precise valuation of what might appear to be comparably
severe injuries.176 This lack of "precision," however, may be regarded
as either a major flaw of the torts system or one of its virtues, depend-
ing on one's perspective. The growing conventional wisdom among
economics-minded academics is that the variation in tort awards
proves that the system is inequitable because like harms are not
treated alike.17 ' The problem with this general position is that there is
no consensus that an individual who suffers a certain type of injury, of
a specified severity, will experience the "same" pain and suffering as
another person who sustains a similar physical injury. Pain and suf-
fering are highly individualistic and, as one commentator notes,
"there is no objective test that measures the severity of the victim's
pain-and-suffering injury."'7T Thus, the failure to achieve precision in
the evaluation of similar injuries, from one perspective, looks more
like a refined analysis of highly individuated injuries from another
perspective. Unless we are to blame plaintiffs for not experiencing
173 See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
174 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 126, at 355 (observing that the calculation of future
earning capacity is "less mathematically precise than it seems").
175 See Geistfeld, supra note 164, at 784-85 (noting that a number of empirical stud-
ies show that "the severity of injury is a good predictor of the size of a pain-and-
suffering award").
171 Mark Geistfeld contends that the current system achieves some degree of
"vertical equity" by awarding higher awards to those who suffer more severe types of
injuries, but fails to achieve "horizontal equity" because there is a wide variation of re-
covery for those sustaining presumably similar injuries within the same category. Id. at
784.
177 See 2 ENTERPRIsE REsPONSIBILnY, supra note 164, at 201-03 (arguing that the
problem with pain-and-suffering damages is "the erratic and unpredictable quality of
the decisions made about this category of award").
178 Geistfeld, supra note 164, at 781; see also DanielJ. Gabler, Comment, Conscious
Pain and Suffering Is Not a Matter of Degree 74 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 307 (1991) (noting
that the experience of pain is always subjective).
[Vol. 146:463
ARCHITECTURE OF BIAS
the modal amount of pain and suffering-in short, for being indi-
viduals-there is nothing particularly troubling about variations in
pain-and-suffering awards, except, of course, for those cases in which
we believe that the jury has awarded an unconscionably high or low
award.
It is also not surprising that awards for pain and suffering are
highly variable, because there is no external market that fixes the
price of such injuries. To my mind, this is a positive feature of our
current system, rather than a shortcoming. Reliance on market prices
tends to perpetuate disparities correlated to gender, race, and other
nonprivileged statuses in society. A critic of market reliance, Richard
Abel, has argued against the conventional wisdom that the market
ought to be the benchmark by which we judge the virtues of the torts
system. He asserts:
Tort damages deliberately reproduce the existing distribution of wealth
and income. Those who question its legitimacy may be troubled that
the state is using its coercive power to re-create inequality.
Furthermore, the cost of preserving privilege is borne by everyone buy-
ing liability insurance, purchasing products and services, and paying
taxes. Thus, all insured car owners pay the cost of compensating the
privileged few who drive Rolls-Royces or earn half a million dollars a
year. They also pay for the superior medical care consumed by victims
from higher socioeconomic strata.1
The nonmarket character of the pain-and-suffering element thus
provides a modest corrective to the status quo nature of the current
system of tort damages that generally replicates the market.89 It pro-
vides an opportunity for a jury to express that a plaintiff's injury is
significant, even if that person is unemployed, is treated at the charity
hospital, or possesses few valuable assets. Whether one is a critic or
supporter of nonpecuniary awards may ultimately depend on one's
view of the market. For those who start from the premise that the
market naturally erodes cultural biases, nonpecuniary damages might
seem suspect. If one's starting point is that the market reflects and
reinforces cultural biases and systems of privilege,'' then nonpecuni-
179 Abel, supra note 125, at 335.
"0 I stress that permitting recovery for pain and suffering is only a modest correc-
tive because often the jury may compute the amount of pain and suffering as a multi-
ple of the victim's economic damages and because, as Abel claims, juries may be more
"solicitous of those who have lost privilege than those who never enjoyed it." Id.
'8' The two attitudes towards market systems are mirrored in the respective views
of economists and sociologists towards labor markets. Jerry Jacobs explains that
"[e]conomists often see labor markets as naturally eroding prejudices and other cul-
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ary damages appear to be a moderating influence in the law that we
should be reluctant to jettison or curtail sharply.
Perhaps the judicial and academic skepticism toward non-
economic loss will not soon translate into further erosion of the right
to recover for nonpecuniary harm. At the least, however, a hierarchy
of types of damages has been erected. In addition to the dichotomies
of physical/mental and property/relational, the dichotomy of eco-
nomic/noneconomic can now be pressed into service to justify deci-
sions regarding tort relief. The recent disparagement of non-
economic loss as fictional-or unreal-legitimates a focus on "real"
(i.e., economic) harm.
III. DISPARATE IMPAcT OF HIERARcHIES OF VALUE
In the abstract, the implicit hierarchies of value look neutral in
the sense that they are not explicitly tied to any gender, racial, or
other group-based classification. Because all persons have a body,
emotions, and personal relationships, it might be thought that every-
one possesses "privileged" and "nonprivileged" interests in equal pro-
portions. As they operate in social context, however, I argue that the
hierarchies of value tend to have a disproportionately negative impact
on women. By disparate impact, I refer to the effects of a facially neu-
tral doctrine on women as a class or on certain subgroups of
women. My basic contention is that the important and recurring
injuries in women's lives tend either to be classified more often as
lower-ranked emotional or relational harms, or to take the form of
noneconomic loss. The ranking thus assigned to "women's inju-
ries"lss makes it more likely that relief will be denied or that recoveries
will be devalued.
tural beliefs that are inconsistent with market efficiency. Sociologists, in contrast, tend
to see employment systems as adaptable systems that reflect as much as determine the
prejudices of the members of a society." Jacobs, supra note 31, at 7.
182 My use of the term "disparate impact" is not meant to suggest that I believe that
all the rules and techniques surrounding disparate impact theory under Title VII
should be imported into tort law. Indeed, the elaborate Title VII doctrine governing
statistical proof of adverse impact cannot easily be applied to assess the effects of tort
rules. Instead, I use "disparate impact" as a term that focuses attention on the effects
of a policy on a particular group in society, realizing that there will often be sharp de-
bates about how to recognize and measure such real-world effects.
1I put "women's injuries" in quotation marks because I wish to disavow any no-
tion that these injuries are somehow naturally, biologically, or essentially linked to
women. Instead, I believe that the disparate impact stems from the particular social




Sometimes the disparate impact is a function of the operation of
specific legal rules. For example, I will discuss how the various restric-
tions on "bystander" recovery for mental distress disproportionately
harm women, and how a legislative cap on noneconomic damages in
health-care-liability actions has an especially harsh effect on low-
income women. Sometimes, however, the disparate impact derives
from the absence of law; for example, the absence in many states of a
cause of action for loss of filial consortium when a child suffers severe
injury. A complete denial of legal recovery to the caretaking parent
disparately harms women because the claim of filial consortium is one
that implicates a particularly important interest in many women's
lives.
In teasing out the disparate impact in tort doctrines, I do not
make the claim that every legal rule that has a disparate impact on
women should be invalidated. Even under Title VII analysis, policies
that produce a disparate impact are lawful if they can be justified as
necessary to further other legitimate aims, such as productivity and
efficiency.'8 Instead, my objective is the more modest one of broad-
ening our analysis. The advantage of a disparate impact analysis is
that it encourages a critical evaluation of the boundaries of tort law.
It asks us to imagine how women evaluate the tragedies and pain in
their own lives-for example, the death or injury of a child, the expe-
rience of sexual exploitation, or the pain of infertility-compared to
the value that is assigned under law by the tort hierarchies.
The three examples of disparate impact I discuss below represent
just the beginning of such an analysis of tort law. Each has already
been noted in the critical scholarship as an instance of gender bias in
tort law. By collecting and grouping the examples, I hope to show
how the use of disparate impact analysis allows us to tease out the
male bias in tort law, and how we should use such analysis routinely to
evaluate the success of tort doctrines or the desirability of tort re-
forms.
'" For commentary on the kind ofjustifications that legitimate use of policies with
a disparate impact in the employment context, see Susan S. Grover, The Business Neces-
sity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L REV. 387, 389-401 (1996).
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A. Primary Caretakers
The care of children in our culture has been disproportionately
assigned to women.1es This means that mothers, grandmothers, and
other female relatives tend to spend more time with children than do
their male counterparts. As their primary caretakers, women have a
greater responsibility for the safety and happiness of children on a
daily basis and are likely to place a very high value on the emotional
and relational ties to the children under their charge. 8 6 This does
not mean that men do not care for or love children. Rather, my
claim is that the social assignment of child-care responsibilities to
women has important implications for tort law.
When a child suffers injury or dies, it can be expected that those
who have special responsibility for caring for the child will also suffer
a grievous injury. After a serious accident, the caretaker must learn to
deal with the child's resulting physical disability and the enormous
change in daily routine that often occurs. Additionally, the injury is
likely to produce a significant change in the quality of the relation-
ship; the caretaker will often experience grief, guilt, and anxiety as a
response to the tragedy. For both the caretaker and the child, such
an accident can be a life-altering event.1
7
Tort law most often treats the caretaker's losses as derivative or
secondary, failing to recognize the full extent of the caretaker's rela-
tional and emotional loss.ss Lucinda Finley has noted that the law's
"5 See Martha L.A. Fineman, MaskingDependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric,
81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2199 (1995) (citing studies showing that "[w]omen continue to
bear the 'burdens of intimacy'" including the vast bulk of child care and housework).
Women have greater responsibility for the care of both dependent children and other
dependent relatives. See Nadine Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 383 (1984-1985) (advocating the adoption of
comprehensive caregiver work-leave programs). Joan Williams has analyzed women's
disparate burden for child care as stemming from men's greater willingness to dele-
gate the care of their children to others. To some extent, in high-income families,
other women can be hired to perform domestic services and child care. In lower-
income families, mothers and other relatives are left with a greater burden of house-
work and child care. SeeJoan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Ali-
mony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-40 (1994).
"6 See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, I S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 152-58 (1992) (discussing the intense emotional involve-
ment of primary caretakers who are most often women).
117 See, e.g., Regina Graycar, Before the High Court: Women's Work: Who Cares?, 14
SYDNEYL. REV. 86, 86-87 (1992) (detailing the hardship of a mother caring for her dis-
abled daughter).
"s For discussions of the evolution of the caselaw on compensation for caretakers'
losses, see Susan J.G. Alexander, A Fairer Hand: Why Courts Must Recognize the Value of a
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reluctance to recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium
has a disproportionate impact on women in their roles as the primary
caretakers of children.'9 The denial of the claim also devalues the ac-
tivity of raising children. Admittedly, the child's "primary" claim may
include an amount for medical and other rehabilitative expenses as-
sociated with the child's physical injury, and for the mental and rela-
tional harm suffered by the child.'9 But the devastating impact the
accident has on the daily life of the caretaker is eclipsed when there is
no separate claim for loss of consortium. In popular culture, the role
of the "soccer mom" 9' is valorized and much is made of the impor-
tance of women making it their first priority to raise children. How-
ever, the hierarchy of tort claims does not so highly value the contri-
butions of parents and other caretakers: The most painful event in a
caretaker's life may not be actionable in tort.
Similar to the devaluation processes discussed in the beginning of
this Article,'9 the devaluation of child rearing harms individuals of
both sexes who devote a significant portion of their lives to this activ-
ity. This gender-linked devaluation of an activity traditionally associ-
ated with women, and still carried on disproportionately by women,
resembles the dynamic underlying comparable worth theory 93 In
Child's Companionship, 8 T.M. COOLEYL. REv. 273, 287-96 (1991);Jean C. Love, Tortious
Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Peron's Society and Com-
panionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590 (1976).
' SeeFinley, supra note 88, at 50.
'90 However, a minority ofjurisdictions still do not permit the injured party to re-
cover for the costs of home health care provided gratuitously by a member of a family.
Thus, in some cases, a mother's or other caretaker's full-time care of a grievously dis-
abled accident victim is given no legal recognition. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt
Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Il. 1979) (citing as still controlling the holding that"a
personal injury plaintiff could not recover for the value of nursing services rendered
by the plaintiff's family" (citingJones & Adams Co. v. George, 81 N.E. 4 (Ill. 1907))).
For a case representing the majority viewpoint, see Bandel v. Fdiedrich, 584 A.2d 800,
802-03 (N.J. 1991) (granting compensation for a mother's gratuitous care in her son's
tort claim). The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that denying such recovery
could "discriminate against the poor, who presumably would be affected more than
the rich, who could afford nursing services." Id.
" See Ann Hulbert, Angels in the Infield, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 1996, at 46
(discussing the soccer mom as a new social category).
12 See supra notes 30-54 and accompanying text.
'13 Martha Fineman has created the term "derivative dependency" to describe the
devalued status of caretakers in our society. Her contention is that, like their charges,
caretakers of children, the elderly, and disabled persons become dependent on society
for resources to enable them to perform this essential labor. Because they often work
in the "uncompensated sphere of the private family," the value of their labor is not
given legal recognition. See Martha A. Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare
"Reform", 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 292-94 (1996).
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this way, tort law contributes to the inferior status of women's work
and arguably perpetuates the assignment of this work to women.
In addition, because even those states that permit loss of filial
consortium claims limit the cause of action to biological or adoptive
parents, the harm to others who take on primary caretaking roles gets
no legal recognition. This limitation likely has a disproportionate
impact on African-Americans and other ethnic groups in which ex-
tended family members-most often grandparents-often have the
primary responsibility for raising children.' 94 This racially dispropor-
tionate impact was recognized in a related context in 1991 when Lou-
isiana codified its rules regarding recovery for bystanders who witness
an injury to a family member. The original bill restricted recovery to
members of the nuclear family, consistent with the state's scheme for
wrongful death recovery.1'5 The bill was amended to include grand-
parents as potential plaintiffs when an African-American legislator
pointed out that he had been raised by his grandparents and that
such a pattern was common in the black community. 96 However,
Louisiana did not also expand its rules regarding who may recover for
loss of consortium to include grandparents as well, creating the
anomaly that only grandparents who witness an injury have a legally
recognized cause of action. Similarly, most states have left the scope
of the consortium claim to the courts, which have refused to extend
consortium claims beyond the nuclear family, perhaps not fully ap-
preciating that families may be defined differently in different com-
munities.
197
Finally, restrictive doctrines like the "danger zone" rule, govern-
ing recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress, tend to hurt
mothers disproportionately as the classic "bystanders." The danger-
zone limitation denies recovery to a parent who witnesses her child's
negligent killing or injury, unless the parent's life is also imperiled.Is
194 See Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: ActualizingInter-
dependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1326-27 (1994) (noting that African-
American grandparents are twice as likely as white grandparents to share a home with
a grandchild and to take on a parental role).
195 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997). Under Louisiana law, wrongful
death beneficiaries consist of spouses, parents, and siblings. Louisiana law afforded no
claims for loss of consortium until the 1982 amendment to article 2315.
' Telephone Interview with Thomas Galligan, Professor, Louisiana State Univer-
sity Law School (Nov. 1996) (discussing the history of article 2315.6 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which provided for bystander recovery in mental distress cases).
'97 See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
' See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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My research on bystander cases'9 details how this legal distinction be-
tween "fear for oneself" and "fear for another" discounts the impor-
tance of a caretaker's relationship to a child.2° The distinction also
denies legal recognition for one of the most highly foreseeable im-
pacts of the negligent killing or death of a child: that a nearby parent
or other person responsible for the child will be traumatized when
they witness the accident. The witnesses to accidents involving chil-
dren are frequently female caretakers. Particularly because most ju-
risdictions deny recovery for loss of filial consortium, the restrictions
on bystander recovery further marginalize the caretaker's injury, pro-
viding no protection for either the relational or the emotional aspects
of the harm.
B. Sexual Harassment
Tort law has never provided a solid basis for recovering for sexual
harassment. This significant gap in the law is largely a product of the
nonprivileged status of emotional harm. Although some harassment
takes the form of physical contact amounting to battery or assault, the
far more common type of harassment consists of claims of hostile
working or educational environments, 201 and involves verbal conduct
and patterns of abuse that do not fall neatly into the traditional inten-
tional tort categories. It is telling that no legal category captures the
full dimensions of sexual harassment as an injury. Tort law treats it
primarily as a dignitary harm under the rubric of emotional distress.
The numerous empirical studies of sexual harassment in the
workplace indicate that the vast majority of harassment victims are
women,202 although there is now growing recognition of the phe-
"9 See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 100, at 837-41, 851-64 (discussing the le-
gal origins and development of the "bystander rule").
20 For discussions of the importance of the caretaker's relationship to a child or
other dependents and the loss suffered when a child is negligently injured, see
Alexander, supra note 188, at 333-37, and Finley, supra note 88, at 50-51.
291 Sexual harassment cases are generally classified into two types: quid pro quo
and hostile environment cases. In quid pro quo cases, the harassment is directly
linked to the grant or denial of an economic benefit. In hostile working environment
cases, there is often no tangible economic harm. Instead, severe and pervasive harass-
ing conduct affects the plaintiff's everyday working conditions and often gives rise to
emotional distress. See BARBARA LINDFMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN EMPLOYENT LAW 8-9 (1992) (comparing quid pro quo and hostile environment
claims).
24Two studies of the federal workforce found that 42% of women experienced
some form of harassment during a two-year period. See DEBORAH L. SIEGEL, NATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SEXUAL HARASSiENT: RESEARCH AND RESOURCES
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nomenon of same-sex sexual harassment of men by male supervisors
and coworkers. 03 The law's treatment of sexual harassment is thus of
special importance to women; any lack of protection tends to have a
profound disparate impact on women.
Catharine MacKinnon was the first to recognize the inadequacy of
tort law as a remedy for sexual harassment. Indeed, her argument for
recognition of a civil fights claim under Title VII was based, in part,
204on the structural deficiencies of tort law. When making claims for
intentional infliction of mental distress, victims of sexual harassment
face an initial hurdle of proving that the defendant's behavior was
"outrageous. 5 Although some plaintiffs have overcome this obsta-
cle,00 most courts still do not regard sexual harassment as per se out-
rageous conduct,207 with the result that the scope of liability under
9 (Susan A. Hallgarth & Mary Ellen S. Capek eds., 1991). In comparison, from 1992 to
1996, approximately 10% of the sexual harassment claims filed with the EEOC were
filed by men. SeeTelephone Interview with EEOC Headquarters (Mar. 3, 1998).
20 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039, at *5
(Mar. 4, 1998) (holding that same-sex harrassment is actionable under Title VII).
Prior to Oncae the federal courts had issued a spate of decisions involving same-sex
harassment, many involving the harassment of gay men or men perceived to be gay.
See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 595 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding same-sex
harassment actionable), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1997)
(No. 97-669); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that
same-sex harassment is actionable if members of one gender group are targeted);
Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *7 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that Title
VII does not support a cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation);
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. 11. 1988) (holding that sexual har-
assment by a fellow male worker is not actionable).
See MACKINNON, supra note 43, at 164-74. MacKinnon argued that the highly
individualistic character of tort law makes it ill-suited to address the social harm of
sexual harassment, claiming that "[t]he essential purpose of tort law... is to compen-
sate individuals one at a time for mischief which befalls them as a consequence of the
one-time ineptitude or nastiness of other individuals." Id. at 172. Now that the harm
of sexual harassment has become established under Title VII law, however, it has mi-
grated into tort law and gained greater legitimacy. The question is no longer whether
tort law or civil rights law is the best forum to address the harm, but why tort law has
not given fuller protection for this recurring injury.
See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 201, at 353-55 (discussing proof of outra-
geousness in sexual harassment cases).
SeeJean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 123, 138-42 (1990) (discussing cases in which
the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was successful).
217 For commentary on the "outrageousness" requirement as it affects sexual har-
assment victims, see Mae C. Quinn, Note, The Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and Twy-
man v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Vctims of Sexual Misconduct, 4TEx.J. WOMEN
& L. 247, 253-58 (1995) (arguing that this requirement makes an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim very difficult to win); KristaJ. Schoenheider, Comment, A
Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Wor*place, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461,
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tort law is even more restrictive than that provided under Title VII 2ls
and similar state antidiscrimination statutes.
This disparity in coverage has substantive as well as procedural
disadvantages, because the newly expanded civil rights remedies un-
der Title VII impose a cap on compensatory and punitive damages for
harassment victims.2 9 This means that, unless the plaintiff can meet
the more onerous requirements of proof for intentional infliction of
mental distress, she may not receive full compensation for her injury.
Moreover, outside the employment and educational contexts, there is
generally no special statutory protection against sexual harassment.
Tort law often provides the sole measure of protection for women
who are harassed on the street,210 or who suffer from sexual exploita-
21!tion by professionals such as divorce lawyers and physicians.
Perhaps even more significant than the special hurdles placed on
the recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress is the law's
failure to provide consistent recognition of claims for negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress stemming from sexual exploitation and har-
assment. The Texas Supreme Court recently debated the gender im-
pact of recognizing such claims. In Boyles v. Kerr, the majority denied
the mental distress claim of a nineteen-year-old woman who suffered
1462-63 (1986) ("In the absence of at least a threat of physical injury or other conduct
a court deems to be sufficiently 'outrageous,' a plaintiff can rarely rely on traditional
tort theories for adequate compensation.").
Although harassment victims proceeding under Title VII need not prove that
their harassment resulted in severe mental distress, see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993), they must establish that the defendant's conduct was "unwelcome,"
"severe or pervasive," and that the employer knew or should have known of the behav-
ior and failed to take prompt, corrective action. The most frequently cited case estab-
lishing the elements of proof is Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982),
discussed in LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 201, at 168-99.
2' The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to permit plaintiffs alleging in-
tentional discrimination to try their cases before a jury and to receive compensatory
and punitive damages. Damages are capped, however, at $50,000 to $300,000, de-
pending on the size of the employer. See42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b), (c)(1) (1994).
Prior to the 1991 Act, there was no right to ajury trial and no recovery of compensa-
tory or punitive damages.
2'0 See Cynthia G. Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women,
106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 548-80 (1993) (analyzing criminal and civil laws that may ad-
dress "street harassment," and proposing new methods to deal with this problem).
2' For a discussion of tort liability of professionals in sex abuse cases, see Denise
LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARV. WOMIEN's L.J.
83, 95-116 (1988) (examining judicial and statutory treatment of liability of psycho-
therapists for exploiting female patients); Thomas Lyon, Sexual Exploitation of Divorce
Clients: The Lawyer's Prerogative?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 159, 188-96 (1987) (discussing
the viability of a cause of action brought by sexually exploited clients against their di-
vorce lawyers based on breach of fiduciary duty).
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mental distress when she learned that the defendant had secretly
videotaped them having sexual intercourse and then showed the tape
to his friends. Over the strong dissent ofJustice Spector, the only
woman on the Texas Supreme Court, the majority abolished the
214claim for negligent infliction of mental distress. Spector pointed
out that the majority's action had a disparate effect on women as a
class and stressed that recovery under intentional tort theories was
"'seldom successful.'"Us Her opinion represents the most thorough
judicial analysis of gender-linked devaluation through marginaliza-
tion of claims for mental distress:
It is no coincidence that both this cause and Bayles involve serious
emotional distress claims asserted by women against men. From the be-
ginning, tort recovery for infliction of emotional distress has developed
primarily as a means of compensating women for injuries inflicted by
men insensitive to the harm caused by their conduct. In "[t]he leading
case which broke through the shackles," [ Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D.
57 (Eng. 1897)], a man amused himself by falsely informing a woman
that her husband had been gravely injured, causing a serious and per-
manent shock to her nervous system. Similarly, in the watershed Texas
case, [Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890)] a man severely beat two
others in the presence of a pregnant woman, who suffered a miscarriage
as a result of her emotional distress....
I do not argue that women alone have an interest in recovery for
emotional distress. However, since the overwhelming majority of emo-
tional distress claims have arisen from harmful conduct by men, rather
than women, I do argue that men have had a disproportionate interest
in downplaying such claims.
Brutish behavior that causes severe injury, even though unintention-
ally, should not be trivialized. Foreclosing recovery for such behavior
may prevent litigation of frivolous claims; but it also denies redress in
216exactly those instances where it is most needed.
The availability of a negligence cause of action is especially im-
portant in cases of sexual harassment because defendants often claim
2 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (reversing a verdict for the plaintiff on
grounds that in Texas there is no general duty not to inflict emotional distress).
2 Spector's dissent can be found in the companion case of Tuyman v. Twiyman,
855 S.W.2d 619, 640 (Tex. 1993) (SpectorJ., dissenting).
214 Spector's opinion is described at length in Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as if
GenderMatters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA.J. SOC. POL'Y& L. 115, 146-50 (1994).
215 Tuwyman, 855 S.W.2d at 643 (Spector, J., dissenting) (quoting language used in
the majority opinion, 855 S.W.2d at 631).
216 Id. at 642-44 (Spector, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting William L.
Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40,42 (1956)).
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that they intended no harm, that they were merely joking, or that
they did not fully appreciate the impact of their conduct. Empirical
research documents a "two worlds" phenomenon in which men and
women often make significantly different assessments of the accept-
ability of sexually related conduct. Generally, women are more likely
to regard sexual conduct in the workplace as offensive, while men are
217more likely to mistake friendliness for seduction. Negligence liabil-
ity is designed to assure that a minimally acceptable level of conduct
is imposed through legal sanctions, thus recognizing that the greatest
harms are often inflicted through ignorance, carelessness, or disre-
gard of the interests of others. When the law withholds this measure
of protection from sexual harassment victims, it fails to respond ade-
quately to a serious, recurring injury in the lives of women.
C. Health Care
In the past two decades, "tort reform" has come to mean initia-
tives to limit tort liability in response to what some business represen-
tatives and others regard as a litigation explosion, composed of frivo-
lous suits and excessive jury awards. Despite several very convincing
studies2' disputing the existence of the crisis and defending the jury
system, the pressure to cut back on plaintiffs' rights has not abated.
Starting at the state level and now gaining momentum at the federal
2 See Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Wor, 6 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHics & PUB. POLy 335, 336-57 (1992) (surveying the social-science research
conducted on sexual harassment in the workplace). The different perception is not
the result of any biological or natural differences in the genders toward sex, but rather
stems from the different social position of men and women. Thus, researchers hy-
pothesize that men's and women's perceptions of sexual harassment reflect their own
self-interest. It is in men's interest to see relatively little sexual harassment, because
men are most often the offenders, whereas it is in women's self-interest to see rela-
tively more sexual harassment, because women tend to be the victims in sexual har-
assment encounters. Women, as a group, also face greater risks of sexual violence,
and as relative newcomers to the workforce, their status is jeopardized in sexualized
environments. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1989) (arguing that women's social po-
sition influences their views of sexual conduct in the workplace).
218 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Liti-
gation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992) (arguing that the
available empirical evidence on the behavior of the tort litigation system is inadequate
for drawing trustworthy conclusions); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of
Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison ofJurors with Legal Profes-
siona4s 78 IoWA L. REV. 883, 890-901 (1993) (reporting on a study that showed no
great disparity between juror awards for pain and suffering and disfigurement and
awards rendered by experienced legal professionals).
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level, 219 proponents have targeted products liability and medical mal-
practice as sites for reform, with a particular focus on noneconomic
and punitive damages. For example, one federal proposal that has
received much attention would cap noneconomic losses in "health
care liability actions," defined as cases of medical negligence or prod-
ucts liability cases involving a medical product.20 There are also pro-
posals to cap punitive damages, either by imposing a dollar limit (e.g.,
$250,000), or by limiting punitive damages to two or three times the
economic loss, regardless of the wealth or size of the defendant.2'
For the first time in the long debate over tort reform, critics of the
cutbacks have begun to assess the gender impact of the various pro-
posals. The most extensive study, by Thomas Koenig and Michael
Rustad, demonstrates that women stand to lose more when
"nonprivileged" types of damages are curtailed, particularly in actions
involving health care.22 Their study revealed that two out of three
plaintiffs receiving punitive damages in medical malpractice litigation
are women, often in gender-linked cases involving mismanaged
childbirth, cosmetic surgery, sexual abuse, and neglect in nursing
homes.224 Critics have also noted that much of mass tort litigation has
centered on women's reproductive health and other gender-linked
injuries, including the Dalkon Shield, Norplant, super-absorbent
tampons, and breast implant litigation. Measures targeting non-
economic awards for health-care liability thus threaten to curtail this
new focus on gender-specific injuries.us
The Koenig and Rustad study also showed that capping
noneconomic damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment
of life would have a disparate effect on women because the non-
economic portion of the tort award is crucial for women plaintiffs.
Because of their depressed wages and unpaid responsibility for child
2'9 The latest products liability reform bill combines caps on punitive damages with
abolition ofjoint and several liability for pain and suffering and other noneconomic
injuries. See Kenneth Jost, Tort Issues Resurrected, A.B.A J., Mar. 1997, at 18 (describing
the fate of the latest tort-reform-liability bill, S. 79, 105th Cong. (1997)).
20 The bill was vetoed by President Clinton. For a discussion of the proposal, see
Finley, supra note 155, at 864.
22 See id
2n Koenig & Rustad, supra note 14, at 29-87.
22 Seeid. at59.
2' See id. at 62-77.
2' See Finley, supra note 155, at 863 (discussing the importance of nonpecuniary-




care and housekeeping, women plaintiffs, as a group, tend to have
smaller economic losses than men of the same age. 6 Even physical
injuries to women may not translate into large awards for medical ex-
penses, particularly if there is no current treatment for the condition.
Thus, when a housewife suffers reproductive injury from being forced
to undergo a hysterectomy caused by damage from an IUD, the pri-
mary measure of her injuries will be noneconomic.2 The proposed
cap on noneconomic damages in health-care actions thus would have
a doubly negative effect on women because it would restrict an impor-
tant element of damages in the very cases women tend to bring.
This latest round in the debate over tort reform underscores the
significance of noneconomic damages to women. Noneconomic
damages serve to offset the disproportionately low value placed on
women's claims when the measures are solely economic. They also
serve as the only means of expressing the value of certain gender-
linked reproductive injuries, such as the loss of fertility. The recent
legislative and judicial trend to solidify the implicit hierarchy of dam-
ages and to privilege economic over noneconomic damages thus has
the potential to further slant the torts system against women's inter-
ests.
IV. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CATEGORIES: THE CONCEPTUAL
VICIOUS CYCLE
My claim that the basic tort hierarchies of value are "gendered" to
the disadvantage of women creates something of a paradox. Con-
temporaryjudges and legislators most often profess a commitment to
gender equality and neutrality; few would openly rely on gender dif-
ferences to justify either denying women's claims or discounting their
injuries. This suggests that the mechanisms that maintain the gen-
dered hierarchies of value are more subtle, that devaluation is ac-
complished through a nondeliberate process that may not look like
See supra text accompanying notes 55-87 (describing gender and race bias in
computing loss of future earning capacity). Given the existing bias with respect to the
economic portion of the damage award, curtailment of noneconomic damages would
intensify the disparate impact.
See Pamela Anagnos Liapakis, Tort Reform Could Leave Women Shortchanged, NAT'L
L.J., July 24, 1995, at C2, C2 (predicting that tort reforms which limit noneconomic
damages will burden female plaintiffs more than male plaintiffs).
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prejudice, hostility, or bias. The source of the bias is not bigotry, but
rather cognitive processes that influence everyone's thinking.m
It is at this point that critical theory figures most explicitly in my
analysis. 9 As I have described the hierarchies of value, they not only
set up a ranking of different types of injuries and types of damages,
they also establish pairs of opposites or dualisms. Embedded in the
hierarchies are three contrasting categories: physical/emotional,
property/relational, and economic/noneconomic. It is important to
notice that these categories are themselves gendered. By gendered, I
mean that if we were asked to link each type of damage or harm with
the adjective "male" or "female," there would be widespread agree-
ment that the left side of the pair (physical, property, economic)
should be labeled "male," while the right side of the pair (emotional,
relational, noneconomic) should be labeled "female."
Many people, myself included, might wish to resist the normative
implications of gendering the pairs in this way: we would dispute that
women are more emotional or that men have less concern for rela-
tionships. Feminist and critical race scholars have also repeatedly
pointed out that the labels do not fit many subgroups of women.230
The stereotypes of domesticity, modesty, and emotionality do not of-
ten attach to African-American and working class women, for exam-
22' Some of the most illuminating scholarly discussions of racism, sexism, and
other discriminatory conduct have focused on social cognition theory and the impor-
tance of categorization. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 25, at 750-59 (discussing the
habit-like aspects of group stereotyping); Krieger, supra note 75, at 1186-17 ("In a cul-
ture in which race, gender, and ethnicity are salient, even the well-intentioned will in-
exorably categorize along racial, gender, and ethnic lines.").
My analysis most closely resembles the process described by Frances Olsen in
her essay The Sex of Law, in the "classic" text of the critical legal studies movement, THE
POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 17, at 453.
m The larger theoretical debate addresses "essentialism" both in mainstream and
feminist theory. The term "essentialism" refers to the idea that there is some com-
mon, underlying attribute or experience shared by all women, independent of race,
class, sexual orientation, or other aspects of their particular situation. One form of
gender essentialism, known as "false universalism," uses an unstated norm of the most
privileged group of women, that is, white, middle-class, heterosexual women, as if it
were applicable to women generally. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKEJ.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 15-17 (1994) (defining "essentialism"). Post-essentialist critics
have shown how even feminist theory is tainted by essentialist premises. See Patricia A.
Cain, Feminist Juisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERIKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 206
(1989-1990) ("Scholarship that nominally recognizes differences, but still categorizes
'woman' from a single perspective is stuck in the assimilationist/essentialist trap.");
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,




ple, who have always worked outside their own homes and are often
stereotyped as coarse and material.23' However, my point in linking
the basic tort categories to their respective gender is to expose the
dominant structures of thought, in part because such structures do
not describe reality for most people. The dominant ideology is not
attuned to the life experiences, perspectives, or situation of the most
marginalized groups in society. Instead, the stereotypes of "women"
are likely to reflect the dominant thinking about white, heterosexual,
232middle-class women, the most privileged subgroup of women. All
persons, however, must learn the meaning of the dominant categories
to live in a world not of our own making.2 3 The very fact that at some
level we "know" that emotions, relations, and noneconomic damages
are gendered female is highly significant. This conceptual linkage af-
fects the way we see the world, including how we categorize injury and
harm.
In my study of tort law, the phenomenon that I have found to be
at once the most interesting and the most infuriating is what I de-
scribe here as the conceptual vicious cycle. This perceptual process
categorizes injury sustained by women as emotional, relational, or
nonpecuniary, even when the same injury could, as a matter of logic,
be characterized as physical, pertaining to property, or pecuniary. In
deciding how to categorize a loss, we look not only in some abstract
way at the nature of the injury, but also at who we believe is suffering
the loss. The conceptual vicious cycle makes the gender of the proto-
typical plaintiff affect the way we conceptualize the nature of the
harm.
The perceptual process I hypothesize here is akin to the process
that occurs when people interpret ambiguous behavior. Social psy-
chologists have conducted experiments measuring human percep-
tion, asking their subjects, for example, to describe an interaction be-
0' For critiques of separate-spheres literature that applies feminine stereotypes of
domesticity, frailty, and delicacy as if they attached to all women, see Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 155 ("[A]ttempt[ing] to debunk ideological justifications for women's subordina-
tion offers little insight into the domination of Black women.").
2 See EuIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF ExcLusION IN
FEMINIST THouGHT 3 (1988) ("[T]he focus on women 'as women' has addressed only
one group of women-namely, white middle-class women of Western industrialized
countries.").
2M Even nondominant groups know, and to some extent, internalize, the prevail-
ing stereotypes and generalizations about them. SeeLawrence, supra note 24, at 351.
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tween two people involving a poke or a shove.2 The action is am-
biguous, in the sense that it could possibly be classified as benign
(dramatizes, gives information, plays around) or threatening
(aggressive, violent, mean). The studies indicate that the race of the
actor is important in determining how the action will be interpreted
or categorized. Thus, whites tend to interpret the ambiguous behav-
iors of black actors as being more threatening and more hostile than
the same behavior undertaken by white actors. The race of the actor
serves to activate a stereotype or cognitive association, such as linking
blacks to violence, that gives meaning to the behavior. The identity of
the actor affects how we perceive the nature of the action.
Moreover, if we accept that the gender of the prototypical plain-
tiff may likewise affect legal categorization, legal categorization itself
begins to look like an active process that involves human choice. In
this way, we can see that the basic legal categories in tort law are so-
cially constructed. The deep structures of tort law are indeed "man-
made." This means, of course, that if we choose, they can also be re-
constructed to fit better our notions of gender equity and fairness.
I first understood this process behind the social construction of
basic tort categories when I read the opinions in Lynch v. Knight, the
old English case that stands for the proposition that mental distur-
The two major studies tested for racially based schemas in interpreting ambigu-
ous information and behavior. In the first study, white students were shown a video-
tape of two male students discussing alternative solutions to a problem, ending in an
ambiguous shove. The subjects were asked to categorize the behavior using the fol-
lowing ten categories: dramatizes, gives information, gives opinion, gives suggestion,
asks for information, asks for opinion, asks for suggestion, playing around, aggressive
behavior, and violent behavior. When the protagonist was black and the victim white,
75% characterized the behavior as violent. When both the protagonist and the victim
were black, 69% perceived violence. For white protagonists, the characterization of
violence was much lower, only 13% when the victim was white, 17% when the victim
was black. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONAUIY & SOc.
PSYCHOL. 590, 595-97 (1976), discussed in Armour, supra note 25, at 752-54 & n.90.
The second study asked school-age children to evaluate the behavior of a child de-
picted in a cartoon and described verbally. The verbal description of the scene was:
"Mark was sitting at this desk, working on a social studies assignment, when David
started poking him in the back with the eraser end of his pencil. Markjust kept on
working. David kept poking for a while, and then he finally stopped." The subjects
rated the behavior as playful, friendly, mean, or threatening. The results confirmed
the earlier study, judging the behavior as more threatening or mean if the poking was
done by a black child. See H. Andrew Sagar &Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behav-
ioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39




bance alone does not qualify as a legally cognizable harm.2 15 Lord
Campbell's opinion was the most revealing. In it, he discussed the
question of why men, but not women, could sue for "criminal conver-
sation," the claim brought by a husband against a man who had inter-
course with the plaintiff's wife. Lord Campbell sincerely believed that
when a wife was not faithful to her husband, the husband suffered
something akin to a permanent loss of property.26 For Lord
Campbell, the loss of the husband's exclusive sexual access to his wife
was a material harm. It was property-like in nature. However, when
he analyzed the losses the wife suffered from her husband's sexual be-
trayal, he saw only hurt feelings and emotional harm. 37 The court
described harm to the wife as merely subjective and intangible.2 To-
day, most people would contend that adultery is adultery, gender-
neutral. In 1861, the gendered dimensions of adultery were appar-
ently more visible.
The conceptual vicious cycle is still at work in the social construc-
tion of tort categories. I offer three more recent examples of the cy-
cle as it affects the three pairs of dualisms that form the hierarchies of
value.
A. Physical/Emotional
When experienced by women, the physical can become the emo-
tional. My study of fright-based injuries analyzed the classic "mental
distress" cases involving female plaintiffs who suffered miscarriages
and stillbirths as a result of emotional trauma. 9 In a very real sense,
these plaintiffs suffered physical injuries. As many of the early com-
mentators pointed out, their cases could easily have been determined
by the same principles and doctrines applied to ordinary negligence
210litigation. Instead, their claims were classified as emotional harm
cases. In this one class of litigation, the law fixed on fright, the
mechanism of the injury, rather than on the ultimate physical conse-
quences of the defendant's actions.24' Moreover, once classified as
emotional, the various restrictive doctrines governing this unprivi-
11 Eng. Rep. 854, 859 (H.L. 1861).
See id. at 860 (opinion of Lord Campbell).
2,7 See id. (opinion of Lord Campbell).
See id. at 863 (opinion of Lord Wensleydale).
a" See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 100, at 814.
240 See id. at 834-37 (discussing the views of Francis Bohlen and Herbert Goodrich).
2"41 See id. at 834 (describing fright as the "mechanism" of the injury, which might
also produce physical consequences).
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leged category of harm reduced the likelihood of recovery. To some
extent, the classification of fright-based physical harms as "mental dis-
tress" persists to this day, as the organization of the basic torts case-
books and treatises demonstrates.2 2 When faced with a choice-a
choice that is inevitable when we construct categories-the law
matched the type of injury (emotional) to the prototypical plaintiff
(pregnant woman).
Lucinda Finley has also discerned the operation of the vicious cy-
cle at work in the law's treatment of women's reproductive and sexu-
alized injuries.243 Finley asserts that tort law tracks the medical profes-
sion and tends to regard harm "to a woman's reproductive system or
sexualized part of her body, like her breasts,"244 as an emotional,
rather than a physical, injury. As an example, she cites the prominent
case of Payton v. Abbott Labs, in which the court refused to allow
women who were injured by the "anti-miscarriage" drug DES to re-
cover for "purely emotional" harm.24 The court characterized the
women's harm as emotional, even though "many DES daughters have
malformations of their cervixes and uteruses, as well as cellular
changes to the vaginal and cervical lining"245 requiring extensive
medical monitoring. A similar dynamic takes place when the effects
of physical deformities arising from breast reduction or enlargement
surgeries are treated by the courts primarily as emotional injuries.247
Finley's research on women's reproductive and sexualized injuries re-
inforces the basic feature of the conceptual vicious cycle, showing that
the characterization of the nature of an injury is an active process ca-
pable of being influenced by the gender of the person suffering
harm.
212 These texts typically contain a separate section on negligent infliction of men-
tal distress, discussing some cases in which the plaintiffs suffer physical as well as men-
tal injuries. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 139, at 226-27 (discussing
"emotional harm" cases); KEETON ET AL, supra note 1, at 359-66 (discussing "mental
disturbance" cases). Students are often confused by the organization until they dis-
cover that "mental distress" cases is a reference to cases in which the mechanism of
harm is fright or mental disturbance, rather than a reference to cases in which plain-
tiffs suffer only mental distress as a consequence of the event.
24 See Finley, supra note 155, at 858-67.
2 Id. at 860.
245 437 N.E.2d 171, 190 (Mass. 1982).





When a loss is experienced by a man, the law highlights its tangi-
ble and objective aspects and downplays its intangible and relational
features. The transformation which occurred with respect to the
claim for loss of spousal consortium 248 suggests the operation of the
conceptual vicious cycle. For as long as the claim was given exclu-
sively to husbands, it was regarded as a property right. Under this
"material version" of the loss of consortium, it was said that the hus-
band owned the services of the wife, in much the same way that the
master owned the services of his servant.29 It did not matter that do-
mestic services performed by a wife generally had no market value
and that, unlike the servant, the wife received no wages. When the
law gradually evolved to permit the husband to claim loss of sex and
society, in addition to loss of household services, there was no imme-
diate change in the categorization of the harm.2 ° Nor was there a
cognitive shift after the passage of the earnings statutes which first af-
forded married women legal rights to the fruits of their own labor.
2
-'
Instead, the one-sided property right in the husband persisted even
with the erosion of coverture. Faced with the incongruity of a hus-
band's claim for loss of his wife's labor, the courts drew a distinction
between paid wage labor, which now belonged to the female worker,
and unpaid household labor, which remained the property of the
husband. Loss of services could thus still be claimed as an element in
the husband's claim for loss of his wife's consortium. Even though
the claim clearly encompassed material and intangible elements, it
survived as a property right until well into the twentieth century.2 2 As
21W See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1996) (discussing the transformation of consortium from a prop-
erty-based tort to a relational injury).
249 See Kevin Lindsey, Note, A More Equitable Approach to Loss of Spousal Consortium,
75 IOWA L. REV. 713, 713 (1990) ("The wife's legal status was akin to that of a servant,
[which] rendered her the property of her husband.").
2W See Silbaugh, supra note 248, at 42 (noting that the husband "retained the abil-
ity to bring a loss of consortium action for both society and services, with society being
derivative of his right to domestic services").
2 See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2181 (1994) ("[C]ourts interpreting
the earnings statutes stubbornly resisted the notion that wives might under any cir-
cumstance be the owners of their own labor.").
212 The turning point came in 1950 when the D.C. Circuit first expanded the claim
to wives. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The court
refused to separate the material (services) from the sentimental (love, affection, com-
panionship, sexual relations) elements of the consortium claim, and thus held the
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long as the consortium claimant was male, the claim was not discred-
ited for being intangible or relational.
In its contemporary gender-neutral form, however, loss of spousal
consortium falls under the category of relational harm. The courts
are split as to whether economic harm from loss of services is still en-
compassed within the claim. In its new "sentimental version," loss of
spousal consortium is now precariously positioned as the only rela-
tional injury which carries protection against negligent interfer-
ence.2 As such, it is vulnerable to the criticisms levied at other rela-
tional torts which have found little acceptance in the courts. Because
the property-like features of the claim disappeared when the claim
was given to female plaintiffs, the claim lost the privilege traditionally
afforded to property. Because it is no longer gendered male, the in-
jury has fallen in rank in the hierarchy. The history of this tort sug-
gests that what constitutes a "material" loss depends on the status of
the "property" owner.
C. Economic/Noneconomic
Perhaps the most clear-cut example of the operation of the con-
ceptual vicious cycle is the valuation of household services, sometimes
called "homemaker" services. For some time, feminists have observed
that work done predominantly by women may not be classified as
"work."2 Until quite recently, the law placed no economic value on a
homemaker's domestic services, a category which encompasses not
only cleaning the house, but also caring for children and other de-
pendents.255 This dramatic undervaluation of women's work has had
wife's claim to be valid, even though it did not encompass a material element. See id.
at 813. However, even in its new, nongendered form, the husband still owned both his
wife's services and his own household labor. The final equalization would not occur
until the wife was accorded the right to recover for her own household labor.
22 See supra note 149. Claims for negligent interference with the parent/child re-
lationship are recognized by only a minority of states. Seesupra note 151.
2" See Finley, supra note 88, at 52-54 (noting that homemaking activities are rarely
appropriately compensated for in damage awards); Graycar, supra note 187, at 91
(noting a central "concern with women's work, and the question of whether it is to be
recognized as having economic value").
Most studies regard the following tasks as housework. preparing meals, washing
dishes, house cleaning, outdoor tasks, shopping, washing and ironing, paying bills,
auto maintenance, driving, and child care. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 248, at 11.
Substantially more than half of women's working hours are spent on housework, while
less than a quarter of men's are so spent. Seeid. at 10.
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consequences not only for distribution of assets upon divorce 2 when
homemakers tried to demonstrate their contributions to the mar-
riage, but also has played a significant role in tort cases for wrongful
death and personal injury.2
7
Several of the final reports of gender bias task forces have dis-
cussed the continued devaluation of homemaker services and the ef-
fects of such devaluation on stay-at-home mothers, employed women,
and men. Plaintiffs' attorneys believe that juries harbor negative
stereotypes about the value of housework and impose artificial ceil-
ings on the value of a homemaker's life.m There is even some evi-
dence that, for comparable injuries, employed women receive higher
damage awards for pain and suffering than homemakers, suggesting
that negative attitudes towards this kind of work carry over to affect
other elements of damages.259 The devalued status of household serv-
ices is a form of gender-linked devaluation that reduces awards for
employed women and men as well. Working mothers are often
awarded paltry sums for their duties as homemakers,2' and the
household tasks that men perform are sometimes invisible,2r" reminis-
cent of the old common fiction that the wife loses nothing of material
value when her husband is injured.
2- For an argument that housework is either not valued or undervalued in divorce,
see id. at 56-67.
257 The failure to value women's work in the home is also evidenced by the reluc-
tance of some courts to allow compensation for gratuitous home-based nursing serv-
ices when they are provided to accident victims by relatives. See supra note 190. It is
disproportionately women who provide such services to family members and others.
See supra note 185.
See, e.g., Gall D. Cox, juries Place Less Value on Homemakers, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 14,
1992, at 1, 37 (noting that the valuation of the life of a homemaker is considerably less
than it is for women who are employed outside the home, with a ceiling of approxi-
mately $450,000).
2" See NEW YORK TASK FORcE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 128 (1986), published in 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 11, 81 (1986-1987) (citing a survey of attorneys in which more respondents
perceived that women working outside the home got higher awards).
2W See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR
GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS 77 (1989) (stating that "[tihere is clear consen-
sus... that homemakers receive less than the economic value of their services"), pub-
lished in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 825, 914-15 (1989); ILUNOIS TASK FORCE, supra note
12, at 186-92 (stating that a "typical female plaintiff will collect a smaller award for lost
future income").
2" See WISCONSIN EQuALJUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 28-29 (1991) (noting
that while Wisconsin model jury instructions account for the value of the household
tasks of a deceased wife, "[n]o such measure exists for a deceased husband who may
have provided [such] services," and recommending the use of gender-neutral lan-
guage in the provision).
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It is not surprising that what is classified as "economic" is tied to
the market, leaving women undervalued in the domestic sphere of
the home and family. The recently erected hierarchy of damages is a
more subtle way of using men's activities as the sole benchmark of
value.
CONCLUSION
There is less discussion these days about the redistributive poten-
tial of tort law. Perhaps we have given up on the idea that the tort sys-
tem can be used as a force for creating equality. By excavating the
deep structures of bias in tort law, I am suggesting a more modest
goal. We should not accept the basic tort categories as neutral, static,
and essential. Instead, before making important decisions, we should
interrogate tort categories to assess their disparate impact on women,
racial minorities, and other less privileged groups in our society. We
should also become more attuned to the way our categories are al-
ready influenced by the gender or race of the victims.
I am particularly critical of the implicit hierarchy of types of inju-
ries. The current skepticism toward compensation for emotional and
relational harms is disproportionate: It discounts the importance of
these injuries in the lives of tort victims and places too much empha-
sis on general fears of unlimited liability and concerns about difficul-
ties of administration. This is not to say that all claims for genuine
mental distress or demonstrable injuries to human relationships
ought to be compensable in tort. We need some workable limitations
on liability. My quarrel with the current system is that, through reli-
ance on the implicit hierarchies, we are apt to shortcut difficult
judgments about which claims deserve legal recognition, simply by
presuming that certain types of injuries, on a categorical basis, are less
worthy. If, as I contend, the basic categories of physical injury, prop-
erty damage, emotional harm, and relational harm are themselves in-
fected with gender and race bias, we should be wary of such categori-
cal thinking.
Similarly, the recent movement to discredit awards of nonpecuni-
ary damages and to solidify a hierarchy of type of damages which fur-
ther privileges economic loss seems misguided. Tort reform should
further objectives other than the impulse to downsize awards by tar-
geting the noneconomic component of tort judgments. The recogni-
tion of noneconomic loss, like the partial acknowledgment of emo-
tional and relational harms, is one feature of the current system that
ameliorates bias against women and racial minorities. We should
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hesitate before enacting reforms that will intensify the disparate im-
pact on nonprivileged groups, and instead consider reforms that
counteract the implicit biases in the system. If caps on recovery are
still thought to be desirable, for example, a more appropriate target
might be loss of future earning capacity, a component of the damage
award that has a greater impact on plaintiffs from more privileged
groups.
My goal in this Article, however, is not to endorse or resist specific
proposals for tort reform. Instead, my points are more general. I be-
lieve it is desirable to develop the habit of routinely assessing the dif-
ferential effects of tort rules, to be cognizant that basic legal catego-
ries are social constructions that are tainted by gender and race bias,
and to advocate gender and race equity as an independent goal of
our torts compensation system. I wish to expose the hierarchies of
values in the hope that, once they are made more visible, we will not
be so impressed with what we see.
* * * * * *
